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I. INTRODUCTION
The proprio motu power is a radical innovation of the Rome Statute.
While prosecutors at prior international tribunals could select individual
cases for investigation and prosecution, they could only operate within
pre-established and rigid jurisdictional boundaries. Jurisdiction for these
previous international criminal tribunals was pre-defined by political
actors, and it generally focused on specific conflicts (World War II,
Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia, Cambodia, Sierra Leone, and
Lebanon).' In contrast, article 15 of the Rome Statute (Statute)
empowers the International Criminal Court (ICC) Prosecutor to
proactively and independently direct the Court's attention toward entire
situations proprio motu, or on her own motion.2 This power is
formidable in light of the Court's sprawling jurisdictional mandate. A
permanent entity with 122 state parties and counting, the Court can
investigate and prosecute crimes committed either on the territory of a
state party or by a national of a state party. 3 The proprio motu power
thus authorizes the Prosecutor to take independent action, without the
sanction or trigger of any political actor, with respect to an expansive
range of situations around the globe.
The Statute established particular criteria that a situation must satisfy
before the Prosecutor may deploy this substantial power. The Statute
first requires the Prosecutor to find a reasonable basis that crimes
prohibited by the Statute have been committed, and that the situation
1. Luis Moreno Ocampo, The InternationalCriminal Court: Seeking Global Justice, 40
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 215, 219 (2007) ("From Nuremburg to the ad hoc tribunals for
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, political authorities selected situations, while international prosecutors
could only select cases within situations. [These prosecutors] had no authority to decide not to
investigate the situation, and they could not decide to investigate beyond the jurisdiction granted
by a political body").
2. A situation encompasses a broad range of potential cases within a particular context.
At the situation stage, individual cases are merely speculative and preliminary. Under article 15
of the Rome Statute, the Prosecutor is charged with making the initial judgment about which
situations merit formal investigation. At that point, the Prosecutor must obtain approval from the
Pre-Trial Chamber to actually initiate such an investigation. Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, art. 15, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute]; see
Ocampo, supra note 1, at 220 ("The Court retains the authority to select situations
independently through the provisions of article 15 of the Statute. The selection of situations is,
therefore, a judicial decision"); William Schabas, Victor's Justice: Selecting Situations at the
InternationalCriminal Court, 43 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 535, 541 (2009) ("For the first time we
have an international criminal tribunal where the choice of situations for prosecution is the
prerogative of a judicial official within the institution and not a political body outside it").
3. In addition, the Court can also act with respect to a situation referred by the U.N.
Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. However, this is an exceptional
provision triggered only by the Security Council. The specified rules are, instead, generally
applicable to defining the jurisdiction of the Court.
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would be admissible before the Court, taking into account concerns of
gravity and complementarity. 4 The Statute also allows the Prosecutor to
decline to proceed, even if all of the above criteria are satisfied, if the
interests of justice so demand.5 The Statute finally requires the
Prosecutor to obtain judicial authorization from the Pre-Trial Chamber
before initiating a propriomotu investigation.6
While this statutory framework is rigorous, it leaves open a critical
question: whether the Prosecutor has any discretion to decide whether to
initiate proprio motu proceedings once she detennines that a situation
satisfies the statutory criteria, or whether instead the Prosecutor is
compelled to seek Pre-Trial Chamber authorization to investigate all
such situations.7 Particularly given the lack of precedent from prior
international criminal tribunals, this statutory silence in practice opens
the door for the Prosecutor to establish the boundaries of this discretion.
Domestic analogies are of limited utility in clarifying the amount of
discretion afforded the ICC Prosecutor. Prosecutorial discretion is a
familiar concept in many domestic criminal justice systems. However,
in domestic systems, prosecutorial discretion is generally limited to
decisions regarding individual cases. 9 Domestic prosecutors are granted
4. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 53. Article 53 of the Rome Statute refers to cases, but
it also has been consistently held to deal with situations. A situation encompasses a broad range
of crimes, perpetrators, and cases. The Court has held that at the point a situation is analyzed,
each individual case remains necessarily speculative. The Prosecutor has clear discretion to
select individual cases for investigation and prosecution, and this Article will not dispute or
address that point. Rather, the focus of this Article is on the Prosecutor's discretion to select
entire situations when actingproprio motu.
5. Id. Although the Statute clearly permits the Prosecutor to exercise discretion if she
deems that an investigation would not serve the interests of justice. However, such a situation
has never occurred in the first decade of the Court's operation, and both the Prosecutor and the
Court have repeatedly characterized it as highly exceptional. Id. The contours of the interests of
justice standard have been heavily debated, and this Article does not propose to add to those
debates.
6. Id.
7. At the time of this writing, the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court is Fatou
Bensouda. For the first ten years of the Court's operation, the Prosecutor was Luis Moreno
Ocampo. Most of the proprio motu actions and decisions analyzed by this Article were made by
Moreno Ocampo during his tenure as Prosecutor. However, Bensouda has not (at least by the
time of this writing) appeared to depart from Moreno Ocampo's general propriomotu decisionmaking processes or priorities. The relevant focus for this Article is not on which specific
Prosecutor made a given decision, but rather on the Prosecutor as an institution, and therefore
this Article will not specifically identify and distinguish decisions made by Moreno Ocampo
from those made by Bensouda. For purposes of consistency, this Article will refer to the
Prosecutor by the feminine pronoun only.
8. Matthew R. Brubacher, ProsecutorialDiscretion at the InternationalCriminal Court,
2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 71, 80 (2004).

9. Margaret deGuzman, Choosing to Prosecute: Expressive Selection at the
International Criminal Court, 33 MICH. J. INT'L L. 265, 269 (2012) [hereinafter deGuzman,
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jurisdiction over pre-defined areas, and they can neither expand the
boundaries of that jurisdiction nor attempt to narrow it. Like prosecutors
at prior international criminal tribunals domestic prosecutors generally
have static jurisdictional mandates.' 6 And, generally, within that
jurisdiction, domestic prosecutors are expected to investigate and
prosecute all crimes, especially all serious crimes, and their jurisdictions
are sufficiently circumscribed to make this expectation feasible."
There is no comparable expectation or possibility for the ICC
Prosecutor.1 In fact, the Statute assumes exactly the opposite-that the
Prosecutor will not investigate and prosecute all crimes within her
jurisdiction.13 The complementary posture of the Court ensures that
states retain the primary responsibility and authority to investigate and
prosecute crimes within their jurisdictions, allowing the Office of the
Prosecutor (OTP) to step in only when they fail to do so. The Prosecutor
is only expected to act as a gap-filler, investigating only those situations
where no genuine domestic action has been taken.
In addition, the ICC's jurisdiction is dynamic, constantly able to
grow and shift its boundaries as new states ratify the Rome Statute.
Within this expansive mandate, the Prosecutor can, under article 15,
trigger the Court's action with respect to particular situations even if
others remain uninvestigated, and even if international crimes are being
committed throughout other swaths of the Court's jurisdiction.14
Choosing to Prosecute].
In national systems, selectivity-discretionary decisions not to prosecute even
though prosecution appears warranted-operates largely at the margins.
Prosecutors are expected to prosecute the vast majority of serious cases; and,
on the rare occasions when a prosecutor's decision whether or not to prosecute
a case is controversial, such debates are generally limited to the particular case.
Id.
10. For example, the Manhattan District Attorney can neither prosecute crimes in Texas
nor categorically refuse to prosecute crimes in the West Village.
11. deGuzman, Choosing to Prosecute, supra note 9, at 269. See generally Daniel D.
Ntanda Nsereko, ProsecutorialDiscretion Before National Courts and InternationalTribunals,
3 J. INT'L CRM. JusT. 124, 135-36 (2005) (reviewing various domestic criminal prosecutorial
models); Schabas, supra note 2, at 541.
12. Id. at 542 (criticizing "mechanistic extrapolation based on the model of national
prosecution").
13. See Kevin Jon Heller, The Role of the International Prosecutors in OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 669-70 (Cesare Romano et al. eds., 2013)

("Unlike domestic prosecutors, who normally have the material resources to prosecute all of the
serious crimes committed within their jurisdictions, international prosecutors are never able to
prosecute more than a small fraction of the suspects who have committed an international
crime"); Schabas, supra note 2, at 542.
14. The Court has held that situations, considered a term of art in this context, are
"generally defined in terms of temporal, territorial, and in some cases personal parameters."
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Current debates about proprio motu selection discretion at the ICC
reveal two competing options. The Prosecutor has suggested that no
such discretion exists, arguing instead that the Statute compels her to
seek authorization to open an investigation whenever she finds that the
statutory requirements are satisfied.' 5 Many scholars argue the opposite:
that constraints on the Court inevitably require the Prosecutor to
exercise discretion when deciding which situations to investigate
proprio motu, and that such discretion allows the Prosecutor to make
essentially unguided political decisions.' 6
This Article will challenge both of these positions. It will argue that
the Prosecutor exercises at least some discretion when identifying
situations for proprio motu action and that many structural aspects of
the Court indeed require that she must. However, the Prosecutor has not
relied on extra-statutory or political criteria to select from among
admissible situations. Rather, the Prosecutor finds and deploys
discretion through her independent capacity to interpret the statutory
criterion of sufficient gravity.' 7 In this way, the Prosecutor has adopted
a compromise position with regard to proprio motu decision-making,
attempting to balance the structural realities and constraints facing the
OTP and the Court as a whole with the statutory restrictions on the
Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Decision on the Applicationsfor Participation
in the Proceedings of VPRS1, VPRS2, VPRS3, VPRS4, VPRS5, and VPRS6, ICC-01/04-tENCorr., 65 (Jan. 17, 2006).
15. See, e.g., Office of the Prosecutor, Statement on the Situation in Kenya,
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/BD438555-33E7-4AO3-

8322-A298A90F24E4/281179/UpdatedsheetKenya 3 2.pdf (last visited June 5, 2013)
[hereinafter Office of the Prosecutor, Statement on the Situation in Kenya]. Office of the
Prosecutor, Draft PolicyPaperon PreliminaryExaminations,INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT

76 (Oct. 2010) [hereinafter Draft Policy Paper], http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/
E278F5A2-A4F9-43D7-83D2-6A2C9CF5D7D7/282515/OTPDraftpolicypaperonpreliminary
examinations04101.pdf (last visited Aug. 27, 2013); Office of the Prosecutor, Annex to the
Paper on Some Policy Issues Before the Office of the Prosecutor: Referrals and
Communications, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 2-3, http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/

278614ED-A8CA-4835-B91D-DB7FA7639EO2/143706/policyannexfinal_210404.pdf
(last
visited Aug. 27, 2013) [hereinafter Referrals and Communications].
16. See, e.g., Schabas, supra note 2, at 541-46; Alexander K.A. Greenawalt, Justice
Without Politics? ProsecutorialDiscretion at the International Criminal Court, 39 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 583 (2007); Allison Marston Danner, Enhancing the Legitimacy and
Accountability of ProsecutorialDiscretion at the InternationalCriminal Court, 97 AM. J. INT'L
L. 510, 521 (2003); Brubacher, supra note 8, at 76.
17. This Article will only analyze the selection of situations proprio motu. It will not
address issues regarding the selection of individual cases. The Prosecutor has clear discretion
over the selection of cases, although there are many remaining issues about how that discretion
should be operationalized. The issue is different with respect to situations: it is not clear whether
the Prosecutor can exercise discretion at all over the selection of situations for proprio motu
actions. Any questions of how that discretion should be deployed are thus secondary to the
initial issue of whether that discretion exists at all.
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nature and scope of the proprio motu power.
Although a step back from wholly unguided decision-making, this
particular manifestation of discretion magnifies the Prosecutor's power
within the Court. Under articles 15 and 53 of the Statute, it is the OTP
that conducts the initial analysis of a situation to determine whether a
reasonable basis exists to believe crimes within the Court's jurisdiction
have been committed and whether the situation would be admissible
before the Court. In doing so, the Prosecutor makes the initial decision
about whether a situation is sufficiently grave.
Gravity is both a central (if not determinative) factor guiding
decisions about where to direct the Court's resources and an inherently
flexible, expansive, and fact-dependent concept.18 Particular situations
can be grave in many different ways-for example, one situation may
involve large numbers of victims, another may involve state-sanctioned
violations ofjus cogens norms, and a third may involve crimes resulting
in long-term devastation of a state's economy or development. Yet, the
founding texts of the Court do not establish a preference for any
particular interpretation of gravity over any other. As a result, multiple
(and, at times, conflicting) interpretations of sufficient gravity become
equally plausible in different contexts. 19
In making proprio motu decisions to date, the Prosecutor has
capitalized on this conceptual indeterminacy. The OTP has consistently
asserted the authority to decide which gravity criteria should be relevant
in different contexts. When undertaking this assessment, the Prosecutor
has prioritized multiple gravity criteria in different ways without
establishing any particular hierarchy or interpretive framework. As a
result, each assessment of sufficient gravity stands in isolation as an
equally plausible alternative. The Prosecutor's proprio motu decisions,
when examined in aggregate, deepen rather than resolve ambiguities
18. The Statute itself emphasizes the importance of gravity in its preamble. The
Prosecutor has consistently emphasized the centrality of gravity. See, e.g., Referrals and
Communications, supra note 15; Office of the Prosecutor, Statement by Luis Moreno Ocampo at
the Informal Meeting of Legal Advisors of Ministries of Foreign Affairs, INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT, 8-9 (Oct. 24, 2005) [hereinafter Statement by Ocampo], http://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/aspdocs/library/organs/otp/speeches/LMO_20051024_English.pdf (last visited
Aug. 27, 2013); Office of the Prosecutor, Report on the Activities Performed During the First
Three Years, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 6-7 (Sept. 12, 2006) [hereinafter Office of the

Prosecutor, Report on the Activities Performed During the First Three Years], http://www.icccpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/D76A5D89-FB64-47A9-9821-725747378AB2/143680/OTP_3yearreport
20060914_English.pdf (last visited Aug. 27, 2013) (arguing that the situations in the Democratic
Republic of Congo and Uganda were the gravest within the Court's jurisdiction). The drafting
history of the Rome Statute further affirms this proposition. See, e.g., Report of the ILC's 46th
Session; Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International
35
Criminal Court, U.N. GAOR 51st Session, Supp. No. 22, Vol. 1, U.N. Doc A/51/22,
(1996).
19. Greenawalt, supra note 16.
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about critical aspects of gravity, such as which qualitative and/or
quantitative factors can indicate whether a situation is sufficiently
grave, and whether a situation must be found graver than others already
before the Court to be admissible. 20 Because different criteria can often
lead to opposite conclusions about whether a situation is sufficiently
grave, the Prosecutor, in claiming the authority to decide which
interpretation should control in any given context, independently
decides what gravity can and should mean. Such interpretive autonomy,
when coupled with the flexibility of the concept itself, strongly
resembles discretion.
The Prosecutor has not, however, asserted any authority to act
outside of the boundaries established by article 53. Rather, the
Prosecutor appears to be acting firmly within the scope of her statutorily
granted power to determine whether particular situations are sufficiently
grave to be admissible before the Court. Because the concept of gravity
is encompassing enough to accommodate different and even
inconsistent interpretations, the Prosecutor's interpretations are not
necessarily ultra vires simply because they may be incoherent in
aggregate. Rather, the Prosecutor has maximized her interpretive power
within the criteria she is allowed to consider, asserting a discretion that
is both cabined and operationalized by law.
The deployment of discretion over propriomotu decisions is in itself
a hugely consequential power for the Prosecutor to claim. However, the
particular manifestation of discretion deployed has an even greater
significance. When the Prosecutor decides that a situation is sufficiently
or insufficiently grave based on a particular set of criteria, she
20. For example, in declining to initiate a proprio motu investigation into the situation in
Iraq, the Prosecutor relied on a purely quantitative analysis of gravity. In contrast, in applying
for Pre-Trial Chamber authorization to initiate proprio motu investigations into the situations in
Kenya and Cote d'Ivoire, the Prosecutor emphasized both quantitative and qualitative factors in
arguing that those situations were sufficiently grave. Moreover, in declining to proceed in Iraq,
the Prosecutor employed a relative gravity analysis, arguing that the situation in Iraq was
substantially less grave than other situations already before the Court. In comparison, in
applying to initiate proprio motu investigations into the situations in Kenya and Cote d'Ivoire,
the Prosecutor only analyzed the absolute gravity of each situation in isolation, without
addressing whether those situations were more or less grave than others before the Court.
Compare Office of the Prosecutor, Response to Communications Received Concerning Iraq,
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (Feb. 2006), http://www.icccpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/04DI43C8-

19FB-466C-AB77-4CDB2FDEBEF7/143682/OTPlettertosendersrelraq9February2006.pdf
[hereinafter Iraq Communications]; Office of the Prosecutor, Situation in the Republic of
Kenya, Request for Authorisation of an Investigation pursuant to Article 15, INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT (Nov. 2009), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc785972.pdf [hereinafter
Kenya Request for Investigation]; Office of the Prosecutor, Situation in Cote d'Ivoire, Request
for Authorisation of an Investigation Pursuantto Article 15, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
(June 2011), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/docl097345.pdf [hereinafter Cote d'Ivoire
Requestfor Investigation].
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independently defines the meaning of gravity.21 Considering the Court's
Chambers have not yet expressly contradicted the Prosecutor's gravity
interpretations, and given that gravity is a mandatory consideration in
all admissibility decisions and not only a proprio motu consideration,
these interpretations may take on the character of law. 22 The Prosecutor,
when making proprio motu decisions, asserts a capacity that is
potentially even more far-reaching than a pure claim of discretion-one
that may radically alter the scope of the Prosecutor's power within the
Court. In independently developing the content of the concept of
gravity, the Prosecutor has created a set of interpretations that are
potentially co-equal to those established by the Court. The precedential
force of these interpretations remains untested and murky. Nonetheless
their power to justify (and, according to the Prosecutor, to compel)
proprio motu decisions gives them significant weight.
To set forth the above arguments, this Article will proceed in
multiple Parts. In Part I, it will chronicle the relevant background,
analyzing the existing rules governing proprio motu actions and
highlighting ambiguities and gaps. It will then analyze the ways in
which proprio motu actions taken by the Prosecutor have attempted to
fill those gaps, looking specifically at the instances where the
Prosecutor has either decided or declined to proceed proprio motu.2 3 In
Part II, this Article will examine both the structural arguments in favor
of prosecutorial discretion in proprio motu selection decisions and the
strong incentives for the Prosecutor to claim that no such discretion
exists. In Part III, this Article will examine how the Prosecutor has
found discretion over proprio motu decisions through the OTP's
independent authority to weigh and prioritize gravity criteria and to
choose different and even inconsistent interpretations of gravity in
different situations. Finally, in Part IV, this Article will analyze the
implications of this gravity-rooted discretion. It will suggest that this
manifestation of discretion, while ostensibly a step away from a truly
unbounded and politicized Prosecutor, is still exceptionally powerful
inasmuch as it potentially allows the Prosecutor to independently make
decisions that take on the character of law while still accommodating
21. See generally Armin Von Bogdandy & Ingo Venzke, Beyond Dispute: International
JudicialInstitutions as Lawmakers, InternationalJudicialLawmaking, 12 GERMAN L.J. 9791003 (2011).
22.

See generally JOSE E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS

(2005).
23. The focus of this Article is largely on the Prosecutor's proprio motu decision-making
before the Pre-Trial Chamber can assert review. This is not to discount the issue of judicial
review, as the Prosecutor must obtain Pre-Trial Chamber approval before opening an
investigation into a situation proprio motu. This Article will address the issue of Pre-Trial
Chamber review and its relevance to the broader issue of prosecutorial discretion inherent in
propriomotu decision-making in Part III.
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inconsistency among interpretations and enables the Prosecutor to
eschew any rigid adherence to the OTP's past practices or decisions.
II. PROPRIO MOTU RULES AND PRACTICE TO DATE

A. Rules Establishedby the Governing Texts of the Court
Article 15 of the Statute governs the deployment of the proprio motu
power.24 It begins by stating, "[T]he Prosecutor may initiate
investigations proprio motu on the basis of information on crimes
within the jurisdiction of the Court." 25 It then continues, "[I]f the
Prosecutor concludes that there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an
investigation, he or she shall submit to the Pre-Trial Chamber a request
for authorization of an investigation, together with any supporting
material collected." 26 At that point, the Pre-Trial Chamber must review
the Prosecutor's application and authorize the commencement of a
formal investigation if it "considers that there is a reasonable basis to
proceed with an investiation" and that the situation is within the
jurisdiction of the Court.
Article 15 contains both permissive and mandatory language,
suggesting both that the Prosecutor "may" initiate investigations and
that she "shall" request authorization from the Pre-Trial Chamber when
she finds the statutory requirements to be satisfied. 28 These paragraphs,
taken together, preserve a degree of ambiguity about whether the
Prosecutor has any discretion to decide whether to proceed with proprio
motu once she determines that a given situation satisfies the statutory
criteria.29 On the one hand, the language of "may" indicates that the
Prosecutor might in fact have the power to decide whether or not to seek
the requisite authorization from the Pre-Trial Chamber once she finds
24. Unless otherwise specified, all references to article provisions will refer to articles of
the Rome Statute.
25. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 15.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. On the potentially ambiguous language in article 15, compare Margaret deGuzman &
William Schabas, Initiation of Investigations and Selection of Cases [hereinafter deGuzman &
Schabas, Initiation of Investigations], in TOwARDS CODIFICATION OF GENERAL RULES AND
PRINCIPALS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 20 (Goran Sluiter ed., 2013), available at

http://ssm.com/abstract-1999003. Avril McDonald & Roelof Haveman, Prosecutorial
Discretion-Some Thoughts on Objectifying the Exercise of ProsecutorialDiscretion by the
Prosecutor of the ICC, Expert Consultation Process on General Issues Relevant to the ICC
Office of the Prosecutor 3 (Apr. 15, 2003), availableat http://www.issa africa.org/anicj/uploads/

McDonald-Havemanissues relevant.pdf [hereinafter ProsecutorialDiscretion].
29. Margaret deGuzman, Gravity and the Legitimacy of the InternationalCriminal Court,
32 FORD. INT'L L. J. 1400, 1430-31 (2009) [hereinafter deGuzman, Gravity].
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the statutory criteria to be met. 30 On the other, the language of "shall"
argues precisely the opposite, indicating that the Prosecutor has no
discretion about whether or not to take rroprio motu action once she
determines that the prerequisites are met.
Article 53 echoes the mandatory components of the language of
article 15. 32 It states, "[T]he Prosecutor shall, having evaluated the
information made available to him or her, initiate an investigation
unless he or she determines that there is no reasonable basis to proceed
under this Statute." 33 It then lists the factors the Prosecutor "shall
consider:" "whether the information indicates that a reasonable basis
exists that a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court was being
committed; whether the case (or situation) would be admissible under
article 17, and whether, despite the above factors, "an investigation
would not serve the interests of justice."3 4
The Regulations of the OTP offer further guidance. Regulation 29,
addressing the initiation of an investigation under article 15, requires the
Prosecutor to analyze "the seriousness of the information" and to
"consider[] the factors set out in article 53" and produce a
recommendation about whether or not a reasonable basis exists to
initiate an investigation.3 5
B. Policies and Strategiesfrom the OTP
The OTP has consistently implied that no discretion exists over
proprio motu selection decisions, 6 suggesting instead that article 53
30.
31.

deGuzman & Schabas, Initiationof Investigations,supra note 28, at 20.
See generally Morten Bergsmo & Pieter Kruger, Article 53: Initiation of an

Investigation, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE ICC: OBSERVERS' NOTES,

ARTICLE BY ARTICLE, 2D. 1065, 1068 (2D ED. 2008) (suggesting that the language of "shall"

requires the Prosecutor to initiate proprio motu proceedings before the Pre-Trial Chamber
whenever she deems the requirements of article 53 to be satisfied).
32. Rule 48 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence directs the OTP to look to article 53
of the Statute for criteria to open proprio motu investigations. Rules and Procedureof Evidence,
rule 48, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, http://www.icc-cpi.int/en-menus/icc/legal%20texts

%20and%20tools/official%20joumal/Documents/RulesProcedureEvidenceEng.pdf. It should be
noted that article 53 applies to all forms of triggering mechanisms, and not just to proprio motu
actions. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 53.
33. Id.
34. Id. Although article 53 uses the word "case," it has repeatedly been held to also apply
to situations. See, e.g., Decision Pursuantto Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorisation
of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya, ICC-01/09-19 (Mar. 31, 2010)
[hereinafter Kenya Decision].
35.

Regulations of the Office of the Prosecutor, Reg. 29(1), INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL

COURT (Apr. 23, 2009), http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/FFF97111-ECD6-40B5-9CDA792BCBE1E695/280253/ICCBDO50109ENG.pdf.
36. Iraq Communications, supra note 20, at 2 ("Where the requirements are satisfied, I
shall submit to a Pre-Trial Chamber of the Court a request for authorization to initiate an
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supplies adequate and exhaustive criteria to guide proprio motu
decision-making.37 The OTP's major early policy statement on selection
of situations-its Draft Criteriafor the Selection of Situations and
Cases-remains unpublished. However, scholars familiar with the
document have characterized it as "implicitly [taking] the position that
[the Prosecutor] does not 'select' situations at all, but rather is
constrained to pursue all situations that meet the criteria for jurisdiction
and admissibility before the Court." 38
The Prosecutor reaffirmed this position in more recent policy papers
investigation"); Referrals and Communications, supra note 15. See also Luis Moreno Ocampo,
18th Diplomatic Briefing to the United Nations (Apr. 26, 2010), at 2, http://www.icccpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/CA355D60-EC32-467A-8CA6-F7FA93D86COB/281862/100426LMOspe
echdiplomaticbriefing final.pdf ("The Court will not be involved in any way in definition of, or
amendments to the law").
37. At the same time, the Prosecutor has acknowledged the relevance of very real
feasibility constraints to the operations of the OTP. These feasibility concerns are not captured
by article 53. Their mention by the Prosecutor may understandably raise the inference of
discretion, especially considering that the OTP itself used the term discretion when discussing
the steps it must take following the receipt of information about crimes potentially within the
Court's jurisdiction. However, examining the OTP's statements more closely reveals that the
Prosecutor is not actually claiming discretion to decide whether or not to initiate proprio motu
investigations into admissible situations. Most notably, the Prosecutor emphasized the relevance
of feasibility considerations when discussing situations referred to the Court as well as situations
identified by article 15 communications. Referrals and Communications,supra note 15, at 2.
In the light of the limited resources, the Office of the Prosecutor is required to
set priorities, taking into account the limits and requirements set out in the
Statute, the general policy of the Office, and all other relevant circumstances,
including the feasibility of conducting an effective investigation in a particular
territory ... Under the Statute, the Prosecutor is entrusted with a broad measure
of discretion with respect to what additional steps should be taken in relation to
information received.
Id. In comparison, the Prosecutor described the decision-making process with respect to proprio
motu actions as solely focusing on the criteria established by article 53, thus implying, despite
the aforementioned feasibility concerns, that article 53 provides the only source of guidance for
proprio motu decisions. Id. (emphasis added) ("Some prioritization based on the factors in
article 53 is necessary").
38. deGuzman, Choosing to Prosecute, supra note 9, at 287; Schabas, supra note 2, at
548. For example, Schabas quotes as follows from the document:
[I]n the view of the [OTP], factors relevant to assessing gravity include: a) the
scale of the crimes; b) the nature of the crimes; c) the manner of commission of
the crimes; and d) the impact of the crimes." The draft document said that these
factors should be considered jointly: no fixed weight should be assigned to the
criteria, but rather a judgment will have to be reached on the facts and
circumstances of each situation.
Id.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2013

11

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 25, Iss. 3 [2013], Art. 2
FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

370

[Vol. 25

and statements. In the Draft Policy Paperon PreliminaryExaminations,
the Prosecutor wrote,
[w]here the OTP has decided independently .

. .

. that there is a

reasonable basis to proceed with opening an investigation into a
situation, and before requesting authorization to the Pre-Trial
Chamber, the Office may inform relevant State(s) of its
determination and offer them the option to refer the situation to
the Court . . . If the State(s) concerned elects not to refer the

situation, the Office remains prepared at all times to proceed
proprio motu, as was done in the Kenya situation.3 9
The Prosecutor thus does not claim discretion to decide whether or
not to proceed once she determines a situation satisfies the requirements
of article 53. Rather, the only additional authority she claims is to first
encourage the relevant State to refer the situation to the Court. Under
this framework, at the point that a situation satisfies the statutory
criteria, it becomes certain that the Court will investigate. The only
remaining issue is which entity-the OTP or the State-will trigger the
investigation.
To more concretely explain the process of proprio motu decisionmaking, the OTP established four investigative phases following the
receipt of article 15 communications. In phase 1, the OTP "conducts an
initial assessment of all information on alleged crimes received under
article 15 ('article 15 communications') to filter out information on
crimes that are outside the jurisdiction of the Court."40 In phase 2, the
OTP
analyzes all information on alleged crimes received or collected
[within a given situation] to determine whether the preconditions
to the exercise of jurisdiction under article 12 are satisfied and
whether there is a reasonable basis to believe that the alleged
crimes fall under the subject-matter jurisdiction of the Court.4 '
In phase 3, the OTP evaluates the admissibility of the situation,
looking both at gravity and complementarity concerns.42 Finally, in
phase 4, the OTP, "having concluded from its preliminary examination
39.
40.

Draft Policy Paper,supra note 15,176.
Office of the Prosecutor, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2012,

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT

1

16 (Nov. 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/C4

33C462-7C4E-4358-8A72-8D99FDOOE8CD/285209/OTP2012ReportonPreliminaryExaminati
ons22Nov2O12.pdf [hereinafter Activities 20121.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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that the situation is facially admissible ... will examine the interests of

justice.

,,43

These four determinations culminate in a decision about whether or
not a particular situation satisfies the requirements of article 53.44 Each
phase corresponds exactly to a component of the statutory framework
set forth in article 53.45 Upon the conclusion of these inquiries, the
Prosecutor must either seek authorization to initiate a proprio motu
investigation from the Pre-Trial Chamber or decline to do so. 46 The
OTP's acknowledgement of only these four decisional phases
demonstrates that, whether or not additional concerns may be relevant
to proprio motu decision-making in practice, the Prosecutor does not
openly claim discretion to consider any such extra-statutory factors.
C. Proprio Motu Actions Taken to Date
At the time of this writing, the Prosecutor has opened two proprio
motu investigations, into the situations in Kenya and Cote d'Ivoire. The
Prosecutor declined to open proprio motu investigations into the
situations in Palestine, Iraq, and Venezuela. Seven additional situations
remain under preliminary examination, an initial and informal
evaluative stage.
1. Investigations Initiated ProprioMotu
Both proprio motu investigations initiated to date addressed postelection violence in African countries. In Kenya, violence perpetrated
by supporters of two competing political parties erupted following a
closely contested presidential election in 2007.47 In applying for PreTrial Chamber authorization to initiate a proprio motu investigation, the
Prosecutor contended that crimes against humanity were committed in
the course of this violence. 4 8 In Cote d'Ivoire, violence perpetrated
largely along political lines swept much of the country following the
disputed outcome of the 2010 presidential election.4 9 Unlike the
violence in Kenya, the situation in Cote d'Ivoire escalated to a noninternational armed conflict between forces supporting each of the
presidential candidates.5 0 In applying for Pre-Trial authorization to
initiate a proprio motu investigation, the Prosecutor alleged that both
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id.
Referrals and Communications, supra note 15.
Rome Statute art. 53.
Id. See also Activities 2012, supra note 40, T 16.
Kenya Requestfor Investigation, supra note 20, T 4-5
Id.
Cote d'Ivoire Requestfor Investigation, supra note 20, TT 2, 12-13.
Id. 4.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2013

13

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 25, Iss. 3 [2013], Art. 2
372

FLORIDA JOURNAL OFINTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 25

crimes against humanity and war crimes had been committed in the
context of this violence.
The Prosecutor did not address the issue of discretion when making
either application to the Court. Rather, the Prosecutor simply argued in
each case that the post-election violence satisfied the requirements of
article 53: that available information provided a reasonable basis to
believe that crimes within the Court's jurisdiction were committed and
that the situations were admissible before the Court." Within the
admissibility analysis, the Prosecutor found both situations to be
sufficiently grave based on a combination of qualitative and quantitative
factors, and that that the crimes in uestion had not been investigated
and prosecuted at the domestic level.
Overall, the two decisions by the Prosecutor to initiate proprio motu
investigations to date have certain notable similarities. Both responded
to violence following contested presidential elections in African
countries. In both situations, the violence was perpetrated or instigated
by competing political factions and directed against supporters of the
opponent. Moreover, in both contexts, the targeted nature of the
violence illuminated significant overlap between political schisms and
ethnic and religious divisions. At least implicitly, the Prosecutor appears
to have identified a particular category of international crimes that
justifies proprio motu action.
2. Declinations to Proceed to ProprioMotu
To date, the Prosecutor has declined to initiate proprio motu
investigations into three situations: Iraq, Venezuela, and Palestine.
These decisions include some of the OTP's most specific statements
about the criteria governing proprio motu decision-making.5 3
51. Kenya Request for Investigation, supra note 20,
54-59, 63-70; Cote d'Ivoire
Requestfor Investigation, supra note 20, f 39, 48-58.
52. Kenya Request for Investigation, supra note 20. TT 56-59; Cote d'Ivoire Request for
Investigation, supra note 20,
39, 57, 74-75; Regulations of the Office of the Prosecutor,
supra note 35, Reg. 29(2).
53. The declinations to proceed with respect to Venezuela and Palestine are less relevant
for the purposes of this Article, as they relied on jurisdictional deficiencies beyond the power of
the OTP to resolve (in the case of Palestine) or on a finding that a reasonable basis did not exist
to believe that the Court had subject matter jurisdiction (in the case of Venezuela). In declining
to initiate an investigation into the situation in Palestine, for example, the Prosecutor decided
that the Assembly of States Parties or the United Nations had to first decide on Palestinian
statehood before the Prosecutor could decide whether or not to initiate a proprio motu
investigation. Office of the Prosecutor, Situation in Palestine,INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT

2 (Apr. 3, 2012), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonly res/C6162BBF-FEB9-4FAFAFA9-836106D2694A/284387/SituationinPalestine030412ENG.pdf.
The government of
Palestine signed an article 12(3) declaration, accepting the Court's jurisdiction on an ad hoc
basis (without ratifying the Rome Statute). Id. Normally, such a declaration would clearly
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Examining the situation in Iraq, the Prosecutor found a reasonable basis
to believe that the war crimes of willful killing and inhuman treatment
of civilians were committed, and admitted that the requirement of
subject matter jurisdiction was satisfied.54 Yet, the Prosecutor still
declined to proceed based on a judgment that the alleged crimes within
the jurisdiction of the Court were insufficiently grave to warrant proprio
motu action.5
In accordance with both the Regulations of the OTP and its own
policy statements, the Prosecutor conceded that multiple factors are
relevant to the gravity inquiry. 56 Ultimately, however, in declining to
proceed, the Prosecutor looked only at the scale of the alleged crimes to
find the situation insufficiently grave. Because the Court could only
exercise jurisdiction over British nationals in that situation, the alleged
crimes within the Court's reach only involved between four and twelve
victims.57 In contrast to the analyses of the situations in Kenya and Cote
d'Ivoire, the Prosecutor did not examine any other gravity factors
beyond scale. Because the Prosecutor found the situation to be
insufficiently grave, there was no need to also consider
complementarity concerns. 58

enable the Prosecutor to exercise proprio motu authority over a situation within the territory, as
she did with respect to the situation in Cote d'Ivoire. Cote d'Ivoire Request for Investigation,
supra note 20, at 15-16. However, because Palestinian statehood was disputed, the Prosecutor
first had to determine whether Palestine could in fact even file an article 12(3) declaration to
accept the Court's jurisdiction. Iraq Communications, supra note 20, at 2. In declining to initiate
a proprio motu investigation into the situation in Venezuela, the Prosecutor could not find a
reasonable basis to believe that crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court had been committed.
The Prosecutor based this finding on the "lack of precision as well as internal and external
inconsistencies in the information" received in external communications about Venezuela.
Office of the Prosecutor, Decision on the Situation in Venezuela, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT 2-3 (Feb. 9, 2006), availableat http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/4E2BC725-6A6340B8-8CDC-ADBA7BCAA9IF/143684/OTP letter to senders reVenezuela_9 February
2006.pdf (last visited May 16, 2013); Sixth Diplomatic Briefing of the ICC to the Security
Council, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 31 (Mar. 23, 2006), availableat http://www.icc-cp
i.int/NR/rdonlyres/8DBF8E9E-4124-4196-8C72-66F3EF65D29C/278524/DB7StEnglish.pdf.
54. Iraq Communications, supra note 20, at 8-9. Although Iraq is not a state party to the
Rome Statute, the particular crimes in question were allegedly committed by British nationals,
and thus they fell within the Court's jurisdiction.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 8; Sixth Diplomatic Briefing of the ICC to the Security Council, supra note 53,
at 8.

58. Iraq Communications, supra note 20, at 9. See generally Report of the International
Criminal Court, Aug. 1, 2011-July 31, 2012, U.N. Doc. A/67/308; GAOR, 67th Sess. (2012).
However, it should be noted that the OTP's declination to investigate the situation in Iraq pre-

dated the decisions to investigate Kenya and Cote d'Ivoire.
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D. PreliminaryExaminations
To date, Kenya and Cote d'Ivoire remain the only situations
investigated proprio motu. However, seven additional situations remain
under 5preliminary examination, an initial and informal evaluative
stage.5 They are: Afghanistan, Honduras, Republic of Korea, Nigeria,
Colombia, Georgia, and Guinea.6 0 The Prosecutor has neither applied
for authorization to commence a proprio motu investigation into any of
these situations nor formally declined to do. Still, their identification by
the OTP suggests their relevance to this inquiry, assuming that they
would not have been so proactively identified by the Prosecutor if they
clearly fell outside the bounds of the statutory criteria.6 ' This Article
thus infers that the situations currently under preliminary examination
were selected because they could at least potentially satisfy the
requirements of article 53.
The Prosecutor is currently analyzing four situations-Afghanistan,
Honduras, Republic of Korea, and Ni§eria-to determine whether the
reasonable basis standard is satisfied. Three additional situationsColombia, Georgia, and Guinea-have been found to satisfy the
reasonable basis requirement, and are now being evaluated for
admissibility. 6 3 In sharp contrast to the consistency in context between
the situations in Kenya and Cote d'Ivoire, the seven situations under
preliminary examination vary widely. They are scattered around many
regions of the world, from Africa to Europe to the Middle East to Asia
to Latin America. 64 They involve war crimes, crimes against humanity,
59. Activities 2012, supranote 40, at 5. It should be noted that Mali is listed in this report,
but it has subsequently been moved to a formal investigation. Id. at 37-41.
60. Notably, the Report on Preliminary Examination Activities for 2012 also includes the
situation in Libya; however, the situation in Libya is no longer under preliminary examination,
as the Prosecutor has sought and obtained arrest warrants for alleged perpetrators. Id. at 5-6.
61. If, for example, there was a clear lack of jurisdiction, if the crimes themselves were
obviously insufficiently grave, or if genuine domestic proceedings were ongoing or had been
completed. It should be noted that the Prosecutor has in the past also placed situations referred
by external actors (states parties or the Security Council) under preliminary examination.
However, all remaining situations under preliminary examinations at the time of this writing
were identified by the Prosecutor and not triggered by an external referral. The OTP's fourphase analysis of preliminary examinations further bolsters this argument, as it makes clear that
the OTP sequentially narrows the situations eligible for preliminary examination and
progressively excludes those falling outside of the statutory criteria. Id. at 3-5
62. Office of the Prosecutor, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2011,
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 6-13 (Dec. 13, 2011) [hereinafter Activities 2011], available

at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/63682F4E-49C8-445D-8C13-F31OA4F3AEC2/284116/
OTPReportonPreliminaryExaminationsl3December20ll.pdf (last visited May 16, 2013).
63. Id. at 14-23
64. Id. at 5. It should be noted that while the OTP is undoubtedly investigating these
situations in detail, far less information is available publicly on the specific situations, relevant
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or some combination of the two, but no situation appears to involve acts
of genocide. 65 All situations but one involve the killing of civilians, five
of the seven involve acts of torture, and four involve crimes of rape or
sexual violence. 6 6 Other crimes committed within particular situations
include attacks against peacekeepers and humanitarian targets,
imprisonment and deprivation of liberty, forced disappearances and
abductions, and displacement of civilian populations.6 Many of these
situations (for example, Afghanistan) have remained under preliminary
examination for years, while other situations (for example, Kenya) were
more rapidly identified and selected for proprio motu proceedings.6 8
The seven situations under preliminary examination do not seem to
present greater degrees of ambiguity with respect to the statutory
criteria than do the two situations currently under proprio motu
investigation.6 9 Looking more closely at situations in each of the two
categories, it is difficult to find a clear distinguishing line, at least with
information publicly available. 70 Rather, the situations currently under
propriomotu investigation do not appear to satisfy the statutory criteria
more unambiguously than do many of the seven under preliminary
crimes, and likely perpetrators and victims than is available for applications that have been
already filed or decided upon.
65. Id. at 7-13.

66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Within three years of the post-election violence, the Prosecutor initiated a proprio
motu investigation into the situation in Kenya. In contrast, the OTP placed the situation in
Afghanistan under preliminary examination in 2007, and it remains there at the time of this
writing six years later.
69. It should be noted that some scholars have made the opposite argument. For example,
Rod Rastan attempts to draw a bright line between the situations under formal investigation and
those under preliminary examination:
[O]ne difference [between situations under investigation and those under
preliminary examination] is that in all of the investigations currently underway,
issues of jurisdiction, admissibility, and the interests of justice appear to have
been relatively clear . . . The situations that remain under preliminary

examination appear to have presented more complex parameters: either relating
to the focus and/or genuineness of ongoing national proceedings; the difficulty
of obtaining clear and credible information in the midst of ongoing armed
conflict; the analysis of large quantities of data submitted by rival national
authorities on the conduct of hostilities; or complex questions related to judicial
competence.
Rod Rastan, Comment on Victor's Justice and the Viability of Ex Ante Standards, 43 J.
MARSHALL L. REv. 569, 578-79 (2009).

70. This Article contemplates the obvious possibility that the OTP has significant
investigative information and analyses of potential actions with respect to all of these situations
that are simply not public. Id. at 579.
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examination. For example, the proprio motu investigation into the
situation in Kenya involved a significant ambiguity with regard to
subject matter jurisdiction. In arguing that the post-election violence
constituted crimes against humanity, the Prosecutor relied upon what
could arguably be seen as a significant expansion in the legal
understanding of a contextual element required by the Statute to find
that incidents constituted crimes against humanity (the definition of an
organizational plan or policy). 7 1 While a majority of the Pre-Trial
Chamber accepted the Prosecutor's contention that the element could be
found, the Court's jurisdiction over these crimes was neither obvious
nor clear-cut.72 As the example of Kenya illuminates, the Prosecutor has
still faced vigorous admissibility challenges to the OTP's proprio motu
initiation of proceedings.7 3
The notable similarities between the situations in Kenya and Cote
d'Ivoire are instead contextual, as both situations involved the
commission of post-election violence in African countries. These
similarities are especially striking given that the two situations were
identified over many of the seven situations remaining under
preliminary examination-situations where the contexts in which
crimes were allegedly committed vary widely.
III. A STRUCTURAL POSTURE IN FAVOR OF DISCRETION

A. An Opportunity to Fill the Statutory Gap
Although the Prosecutor has taken the position that article 15
compels her to take proprio motu action whenever the statutory
requirements are satisfied, compelling countervailing considerations
combined with the Prosecutor's proprio motu decision-making to date
suggest that at least some degree of discretion exists in practice, and
71. The Pre-Trial Chamber engaged in a vigorous debate about whether the loosely
organized nature of the post-election violence satisfied the requirement that the crimes be
committed pursuant to an organizational plan or policy-a required contextual element to
demonstrate crimes against humanity. Kenya Decision, supra note 34, at 28; see also Rome
Statute, supra note 2, art. 7(2).
72. See generally Kenya Decision, supra note 34 (Kaul, J., dissenting). Judge Kaul
argued that these attacks did not in fact rise to the level of crimes against humanity because the
facts alleged did not adequately demonstrate the existence of such a plan or policy to commit the
attacks. Id.
73. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Muthaura, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Judgment on the
Appeal of the Republic of Kenya Against the Decision of Pre-TrialChamber II of 30 May 2011
Entitled "Decision on the Application by the Government of Kenya Challenging the
Admissibility of the Case Pursuant to Article 19(2)(b) of the Statute" (Aug. 30, 2011),
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/docl223134.pdf [hereinafter Kenya Admissibility Appeal].
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indeed many aspects of the Court's structure further indicate that it
must. At the same time, the Statute does not empower the Prosecutor to
exercise any such discretion. The statutory silence has left the door open
for the Prosecutor and the Court to assert how much proprio motu
discretion can be claimed. Simply debating whether or not the
Prosecutor exercises discretion at all over proprio motu decisions casts
the issues too crudely. Rather, much space exists between the two
extremes. 74 Looking at the OTP's proprio motu practice to date, the
choice does not seem to be between total discretion or none at all, but
instead between different modes of decision-making that enable and
constrain prosecutorial discretion in different ways.
Based on the relevant texts, it seems fairly clear that the Prosecutor
could claim only dubious legal authority to rely on extra-statutory
criteria to guide her selection of situations for proprio motu action.
There is no indication either from the relevant statutory provisions or
from the drafting history that article 53 was intended to be anything
other than the sole source of criteria for the initiation of investigations
into situations; nor are there indications of where the Prosecutor might
find other relevant factors to consider. 75
74. Hector Olasolo seems to characterize these two poles as limited and unlimited
political discretion. Olasolo defines limited political discretion as "the assessment of the
convenience of carrying out a certain action . . . in order to achieve a previously established
political goal." He argues that limited political discretion exists with respect to the interpretation
of the article 53 factors of reasonable basis, gravity, and complementarity. In contrast, Olasolo
defines unlimited political discretion as "the power to define, and re-define, the ultimate
political goals that direct its analysis of the convenience of carrying out a certain activity." He
argues the interests of justice determination allows the Prosecutor to exercise unlimited political
discretion. See Hector Olasolo, The Prosecutor of the ICC Before the Initiation of
Investigations:A Quasi-Judicialor a PoliticalBody, 3 INT'L CRIM. L. REv. 87, 111 (2003). The
power to decline to prosecute based on the interests of justice does not wholly resolve the issue.
A finding that an investigation would not be in the interests of justice has, to date, never been
made, and it has repeatedly been characterized as exceptional and rare, suggesting that it alone
cannot resolve this problem. Office of the Prosecutor, Policy Paperon the Interests of Justice,
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 1 (Sept. 2007), available at http://www.ice-cpi.int/NR/
rdonlyres/772C95C9-F54D-4321-BFO9-73422BB23528/143640/ICCOTPInterestsOflustice.pdf
(last visited May 17, 2013); Philippa Webb, The ICC Prosecutor'sDiscretion not to Proceed in
the Interests of Justice, 50 CRIM. L.Q. 305 (2005). Because it seems highly unlikely that the
Prosecutor will regularly rely upon the interests of justice to justify selection decisions, this
Article focuses instead on whether the Prosecutor can claim additional discretion to select
situations beyond and distinct from that provided by the interests of justice once the
requirements of article 53 are satisfied.
75. See, e.g., Report on the Commission to the GeneralAssembly on the Work of its 44th
Session, 47 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10), U.N. Doc. A/87/10, available at http://daccess-ddsReport on the
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N92/416/03/PDF/N9241603.pdf?OpenElement;
Commission to the General Assembly on the Work of its 46th Session, 49 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 10), U.N. Doc. A/49/10, availableat http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N94/
349/31/IMG/N9434931.pdf?OpenElement; Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the
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However, discretion is not inextricably linked to the power to
consider factors beyond those specified in the Statute. While identifying
and relying on extra-statutory criteria to guide proprio motu decisionmaking may be an extreme form of discretion, it is not the only possible
manifestation. Rather, the Prosecutor can also assert discretion over
proprio motu decisions within criteria the Statute requires her to
consider. The combination of statutory gaps with respect to critical
aspects of the proprio motu power and expansive and encompassing
admissibility criteria argues that the Statute itself accommodates such
discretion.
B. The StructuralNeedfor Discretion
There are clear structural needs for some decisional mechanism to
winnow and prioritize the many situations potentially within the Court's
reach. 76 Many scholars have challenged the ability of article 53 to
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, U.N. GAOR, 50th Session, Supp. No. 22,
U.N. Doc. A/50/22, available at http://www.undemocracy.com/A-50-22.pdf; Comments
Received Pursuantto Paragraph4 of General Assembly Resolution 49/53 on the Establishment
of an International Criminal Court, Report to the Secretary General, U.N. Doc.
A/AC.244/1/Add.1 (1995), available at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N95/
091/71/PDF/N9509171.pdfOpenElement; Summary Record of the 11th Meeting, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.11, at 22-29 (1998); Sixth Diplomatic Briefing of the ICC to the Security
Council, supra note 53, at 8. See also McDonald & Haveman, supra note 28 ("The language of
article 53(1) suggests that the three stipulated bases for considering whether to proceed with an
investigation are mandatory and exhaustive and not merely illustrative"). Julian Arato,
Constitutionality and ConstitutionalismBeyond the State: Two Perspectives on the Material
Constitution of the UnitedNations, 10 INT'L J. CONST. L. 629 (2012).
76. Geert-Alexander Knoops, Challenging the Legitimacy of Initiating Contemporary
International Criminal Proceedings: Rethinking ProsecutorialDiscretionary Powers from a
Legal, Ethical, and PoliticalPerspective, 15 CRIM. L. F. 365, 377 (2004) ("As the criteria upon
which the ICC Prosecutor opts for an investigation and prosecution are not well-defined, this
leads to the danger that such investigation and prosecution decisions may be perceived as
political by the international community"). See Thomas Obel Hansen, The International
Criminal Court in Kenya: Three Defining Features of a Contested Accountability Process and
Their Implications for the Future of InternationalJustice, 18 AUSTL. J. HUM. RTs. 187, 196
(2012) ("[T]he Rome Statute offers little guidance concerning where the ICC should intervene,
and therefore also how to prioritize the resources of a court that was never intended to prosecute
all of the crimes that fall within its jurisdiction."); see also Greenawalt,supra note 16, at 653-56
(arguing that standards are not actually beneficial for certain types of problems that do not
accommodate objective, ex ante rulemaking. The broader point he seems to make is that
standards for their own sake, especially when mismatched to the nature of the problem they
attempt to govern, may in fact decrease the legitimacy of the decision-making they are used to
justify); Jens David Ohlin, Peace, Security, and ProsecutorialDiscretion, in THE EMERGING
PRACTICE OF THE ICC 185, 200 (Carsten Staln & Goran Sluiter eds., 2008), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-1266685 ("One can well imagine a situation in the future where a
prosecutor's decision [whether or not to open an investigation] is heavily influenced by matters
of collective peace and security, but the decision is publicly justified by appealing to the gravity
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adequately limit the OTP's investigative load. Instead, they argue that
numerous practical and structural constraints on the OTP and the Court
as a whole make it impossible for the Prosecutor to take proprio motu
action with respect to every situation satisfying the statutory
requirements.7 7 The Prosecutor's claims to be exclusively guided by
article 53 when making proprio motu decisions thus inevitably ring
false. Rather, the Prosecutor's claim that no discretion exists with
respect to proprio motu decision-making seems to be a mere attempt to
adhere to ex ante standards.7 8
The OTP's fundamental dependence on external actors argues
strongly in favor of some form of discretion. This is a significant
constraint on its ability to investigate and prosecute international
crimes. The OTP relies almost wholly on states to perform or authorize
many of its most critical functions, from consenting to on-the-ground
investigations and gathering of evidence to protecting witnesses to
physically detaining and transferring indicted suspects to the Court.
Without such cooperation, the OTP's actions are essentially frozen, held
in limbo, and the Court is unable to perform its primary functions.7 9
Operating within this context, the OTP has powerful incentives to
investigate situations where the likelihood of support and cooperation
are high-where, essentially, it is "possible in all reality to initiate an
investigation at all[.]"soYet, the Statute does not expressly sanction such
of the situation.").
77. See, e.g., Schabas, supra note 2, at 546 (characterizing the suggestion that the
Prosecutor would "proceed with everything that is admissible" as the "height of absurdity"). For
example, the Court has been unable to proceed with respect to indicted Sudanese President
Omar Hassan Al-Bashir because states parties are refusing to honor obligations to enforce the
outstanding arrest warrant when Bashir entered their jurisdictions. See also Danner, supra note
16, at 511.
78. Office of the Prosecutor, Paper on Some Policy Issues before the Office of the
Prosecutor, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 2 (Sept. 2003), http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/
rdonlyres/1FA7C4C6-DE5F-42B7-8B25-60AA962ED8B6/143594/030905_PolicyPaper.pdf;
see also Referrals and Communications, supra note 15, at 5. For example, many have written
about the incentives for the Court not to go after state or government actors but instead to pursue
rebel or opposition parties because of such feasibility and cooperation concerns. See, e.g., Sarah
M.H. Nouwen & Wouter G. Werner, Doing Justice to the Political: The InternationalCriminal
Court in Uganda and Sudan, 21 EUR. J. INT'L L. 941 (2010); Payam Akhavan, The Lord's
Resistance Army Case: Uganda's Submission of the First State Referral to the International
CriminalCourt, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 403 (2005).
79. This dynamic played out in the situation in Kenya. Originally, the Kenyan government
expressed support for the proprio motu investigation. However, this support has significantly
waned and turned into opposition as the Court continues to investigate and attempt to prosecute
specific cases. For an overview of this history, see generally Hansen, supra note 76.
80. Schabas, supra note 2, at 542 ("One simple and adequate reason explaining why
international criminal tribunals do not aspire to prosecute all international crimes within their
jurisdiction when these go unpunished is that there are simply not enough resources [to do
so]."); Webb, supra note 74, at 315; Brubacher, supra note 8, at 76 ("Obligating the Prosecutor
to launch investigations into all such cases [satisfying the requirements of article 53] would be a
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a feasibility assessment. Certainly, the OTP may still choose to initiate
politically unpopular investigations, and indeed investigations may
become unpopular even after the relevant state initially expressed
support.' Still, the OTP's fundamental dependence on external actors
strongly suggests that the Prosecutor must at least be aware of these
incentives, even if she ultimately does not act on them.
This dependence on external actors must also be examined in light of
the significantly limited resources of the Court as a whole. Many
scholars have commented extensively on the inadequacy of the Court's
budget to actually support the investigation and prosecution of all
international crimes occurring within the Court's jurisdiction. 82 With
122 states parties to the Rome Statute and counting, the Court faces at
least the potentiality of "credible allegations of crimes . .. in a variety of

situations around the globe[.]" 8 3 Since the court's establishment, the
OTP has received close to 10,000 article 15 communications, including
382 in the first nine months of 2012.84 While some of these
communications refer to situations clearly outside of the Court's
jurisdiction and thus can be easily disposed of, many others likel refer
to situations that are at least potentially of interest to the Court. Yet,
presently, the OTP is only investigating seven situations, and another
seven remain under preliminary examination. 86 Moreover, it took
almost a decade following the Court's inception, and six years after
gaining custody of the defendant, for the OTP to complete its first
prosecution. These facts indicate that the OTP simply lacks the capacity
to investigate every situation satisfying the requirements of article 53.
They further suggest that the Prosecutor's claim that she must
investigate all situations satisfying the criteria of article 53 is simply
rhetoric and virtually impossible in practice.

practical impossibility . . . ."); see William W. Burke-White, Proactive Complementarity: The
InternationalCriminalCourt andNational Courts in the Rome System of InternationalJustice,
49 HARv. INT'L L.J. 53, 69 (2008); Greenawalt, supra note 16, at 610; see generally James A.
Goldston, More CandourAbout Criteria: The Exercise of Discretion by the Prosecutorof the
InternationalCriminalCourt, 8 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 383 (2010).

81. Schabas, supra note 2, at 543; Brubacher, supra note 8, at 76 (noting the magnitude
of potential referrals to the OTP); see Greenawalt, supra note 16, at 626-27.
82. Activities 2012, supra note 40, 1 17.
83. See, e.g., Schabas, supra note 2. It should be noted that the OTP does not release
publicly exact metrics on this point.
84. Activities 2012, supra note 40.
85. Id.
86. Schabas, supra note 2, at 542-43.
87. Regulations of the Office of the Prosecutor,supra note 35, Reg. 29(1); Office of the
Prosecutor, Statement on the Situation in Kenya, supra note 15, IM76, 83; Bergsmo & Kruger,
supra note 31, at 1067-68; Giuliano Turone, Powers and Duties of the Prosecutor,in 2 THE
ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 1137, 1147-52

(Antonio Cassese et al. eds., 2002).
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C. Incentivesfor the Prosecutorto DisclaimDiscretion
Despite the many structural arguments in favor of some form of
discretion, the OTP has consistently denied that any form of proprio
motu discretion exists, and many scholars agree with that contention.8 8
They argue that the Prosecutor's proprio motu decisions are purely legal
conclusions based on objective statutory criteria, and that once the
Prosecutor determines that the criteria are satisfied, she must proceed.
Such a conception of proprio motu action rigidly circumscribes the
boundaries of the Prosecutor's decision-making to exclude any
subjective analyses of the statutory criteria and reliance on any
potentially extra-statutory considerations. 90
This conception of propriomotu decision-making assumes that there
are only two options. Either a situation does not satisfy the requirements
of article 53, in which case the OTP cannot proceed, or it does satisfy
those requirements, in which case the OTP must proceed. 91 The first
contention is undisputed: it cannot be credibly argued that the
Prosecutor can initiate proprio motu investigations without satisfying
88. Rastan, supra note 69, at 597 ("The task of selecting which situations to open for
investigation will therefore fall back on the statutory criteria established by Article 53(1) of the
Rome Statute . . . . If these criteria are fulfilled, the Statute asserts that the Prosecutor 'shall
initiate an investigation."'); id. at 598 (Rastan argues, "determinations with respect to the other
stipulated factors (jurisdiction and admissibility) do not appear to be discretionary-if they are
fulfilled, the Prosecutor is required to proceed."); see also Morten Bergsmo & Jelena Peji6,
Article 15: Prosecutor, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL

CRIMINAL COURT (Otto Trifflerer ed., 2d ed. 2008); Dov Jacobs, A Samson at the International
Criminal Court: The Powers of the Prosecutorat the Pre-TrialPhase, 6 L. & PRAC. INT'L CTS.
& TRIBUNALS 317, 328 (2007) ("[Ilt is difficult to see how, if both jurisdiction and admissibility
criteria are satisfied, allowing for the Prosecutor not to investigate crimes of such gravity
committed by persons bearing the greatest responsibility would not be a violation of the
Statute.").
89. Rastan, supra note 69, at 598.
[The] institutional design [established by article 53] appears to have been
crafted to establish an objective process leading to the opening of investigations
based on the fulfillment of ex ante criteria. Thus, compared to case selection
where the Office of the Prosecutor is presumed to enjoy broad discretion in
identifying cases from a large pool of possible suspects and conduct, the
selection function at the situation stage is more narrowly circumscribed and the
discretion outlet more closely regulated.
Id.
90. Regulations of the Office of the Prosecutor,supra note 35, Reg. 29(1); Office of the
Prosecutor, Statement on the Situation in Kenya, supra note 15, at 76, 83; Bergsmo & Kruger,
supra note 31, at 1067-68; Turone, supra note 87.
91. Currently, all of the situations before the Court are in Africa, a fact frequently relied
on to challenge the legitimacy and impartiality of the OTP. For example, the African Union has
vigorously contested the Court's actions, especially with respect to the indictment of Sudanese
President Omar Hassan Al Bashir, and it has openly advocated a policy of non-compliance.
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the requirements of article 53. However, the second contention does not
automatically flow from the first premise. The fact that the Prosecutor
cannot initiate an investigation unless the statutory criteria are met does
not require the Prosecutor to initiate investigations into all situations
that do satisfy the criteria.
Still, the OTP faces many powerful incentives to disclaim any form
of proprio motu discretion. Article 15 clearly gives the Prosecutor
independent power to direct the Court's attention toward particular
situations, contexts, and conflicts. Decisions about where to allocate the
Court's exceptionally limited resources are often highly charged and
politically contentious among the Court's varied stakeholders. 2 Over
the first eight years of the Court's operation, all situations under
investigation by the Court were referred by external actors (states
parties and the Security Council).9 3 The Prosecutor did not proactively
identify those situations or direct the Court's resources toward them.
The relevant external stakeholders-the states where the crimes
occurred, or the Security Council acting under Chapter VII-were
therefore directly implicated in the Court's investigative and
prosecutorial actions. 94 There was not the same direct buy-in from the
key external stakeholders to the investigations into the situations in
Kenya and Cote d'Ivoire. 95 Suggesting that the Statute compelled the
decision to initiate investigations into those situations seems to be an
attempt to mitigate resulting critiques by denying the element of
92. The Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, referred the
situation in Darfur to the Court. The remaining situations in Northern Uganda, the Democratic
Republic of Congo, and the Central African Republic were self-referred by the territorial states.
The investigation into the situation in Kenya, opened in 2010, marked the first use of the
Prosecutor's proprio motu powers.
93. Former Prosecutor Moreno Ocampo has made such arguments with respect to the
investigation of the situation in Darfur in response to criticisms of the resulting indictments.
94. See, e.g., Karen Rothmyer, Kenyans Put Criminal Court on Trial, NATION, May 28,
2012, at 20, 21, available at http://www.thenation.com/article/167810/international-criminalcourt-trial-kenya#.
95. Rastan, supra note 69, at 578 (refuting the criticisms that the Court focuses excessively
on situations in Africa by noting that "[i]f the statutory criteria [required by article 53] are met, a
principled approach would require the Court to proceed, irrespective of whether the short-term
outcome is another situation in Africa."); deGuzman, Gravity,supranote 29, at 1442.
In asserting that his selections are 'mandated' by the Statute, the Prosecutor
seems to be signaling that they should derive sociological legitimacy from this
legal genesis. In other words, the Prosecutor appears to believe that if he is
viewed to be following legally mandated procedures for selecting situations and
cases his decisions will be considered legitimate.
Id; Luc Cote, Independence and Impartiality, in INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTORS 319, 353-55

(Luc Reydams et al. eds., 2012).
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prosecutorial choice. 96
Similar charges of illegitimacy and selectivity have certainly been
levied at other international prosecutors, and it is unrealistic, especially
given the nature and scope of the Court's work, to expect that the
Prosecutor would be immune to them.9 7 Yet, the unique structure of the
Court means that such critiques come with tangible consequences.
Because the OTP lacks an independent enforcement arm, it relies
wholly on state cooperation to acquire suspects for trial. Additionally, it
must obtain state consent to conduct on-the-ground investigations. 98
Although states parties have already ratified the Statute and accepted its
obligations, they still have all too often proven willing and able to
actively thwart their obligations of cooperation when they disagree with
the Prosecutor's decisions. 99 That the drafters did not identify any
additional criteria to govern the proprio motu selection of situations
implies that they might have viewed article 53 as both sufficient and
exhaustive.' 00 States parties accepted these criteria when they ratified
96. For example, the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia was criticized for refusing to investigate alleged crimes committed by NATO.
Similarly, the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda faced criticisms for
not investigating crimes committed by the RPF. On the ICTY decision, see generally
Prosecutor'sReport on the Nato Bombing Campaign, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR
THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA (June 13, 2000), http://www.icty.org/sid/7846; Paolo Benvenuti, The

ICTY Prosecutor and the Review of the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, 12 EUR. J. INT'L L. 503 (2001); Andreas Laursen, NA TO, the War Over
Kosovo, and the ICTY Investigation, 17 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 765 (2002); Tania Voon, Pointing
the Finger: Civilian Casualties of NATO Bombing in the Kosovo Conflict, 16 AM. U. INT'L L.
REv. 1083 (2001). On the ICTR practice, see generally Letter from Hassan Jallow, Chief
Prosecutor, ICTR, to Kenneth Roth, Executive Director, Human Rights Watch (June 22, 2009)
(on file with Human Rights Watch), availableat http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_
material/2009 06 Rwanda JallowResponse.pdf; Katherine Iliopoulous, ICTR Accused of OneSided Justice, CRIMES OF WAR, http://www.crimesofwar.org/commentary/ictr-accused-of-onesided-justice/ (last visited May 17, 2013); Luc Reydams, The ICTR Ten Years On: Back to the
Nuremberg Paradigm?,3 J. INT'L CRIM. J. 977 (2005); Hanna Morrill, ChallengingImpunity?
The Failureof the InternationalCriminal Tribunalfor Rwanda to Prosecute Paul Kagame, 37
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 683 (2012); Laurence R. Helfer & Karen J. Alter, Legitimacy and
Lawmaking: A Tale of Three InternationalCourts, 14 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 479, 485

(2013) ("[a] court can engender such [legitimacy] challenges simply by exercising the review
functions that states have expressly and unambiguously delegated to it.").
97.

On enforcement, see generally M. Cherif Bassiouni, 2 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL

LAW (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 3d ed. 2008); Beth Simmons & Allison Marston Danner,
Credible Commitments and the International Criminal Court, 64 INT'L ORG. 225 (2010);
Mahnoush H. Arsanjani & W. Michael Reisman, The Law-in-Action of the International
Criminal Court, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 385 (2005).
98. See, e.g., Kenya's active opposition to the ICC's prosecutions of President Uhuru
Kenyatta and Deputy President William Ruto, and the recent efforts to withdraw from the ICC
altogether: Kenyan AlPs Vote to Withdraw from ICC, BBC NEWS (Sept. 5, 2013), http://www.
bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-23969316.
99. William Schabas, ProsecutorialDiscretion v. JudicialActivism at the International
Criminal Court, 6 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 731, 740 (2008).

100. This effort to implicate states in the Prosecutor's actions can also be seen in the
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the Rome Statute. By purporting to base her conclusions solely on the
criteria established by article 53 rather than on any additional
discretionary considerations, the Prosecutor directly implicates the
parties who are so vital to the Court's functioning in her proprio motu
decision-making.101

More broadly, adherence to pre-established standards and criteria
has been often recognized as a factor relevant to the legitimacy of the
resulting decisions, particularly with respect to prosecutors.1 02 I
claiming to only make proprio motu decisions that are guided and
bound by the criteria established by article 53, the Prosecutor seems to
attempt to embrace these elements of "good process."' 03 In contrast,
decision-making based on factors outside of the framework of the Rome
Statute and the Court's associated constituting texts could credibly raise
the inference of ultra vires actions. If the Prosecutor were to base
decisions on such extra-statutory factors, those actions would almost
certainly be seen as illegal power grabs, undermining the legitimacy of
the OTP and the Court as a whole, 104 especially considering that the
decision about whether or not to initiate a proprio motu investigation
effectively entails a choice about how to prioritize the Court's limited
resources. These choices "raise the general question of whether the
Prosecutor's
policymaking
functions
bear
sufficient
legal
accountability." f Denying the existence of any proprio motu discretion
seems to be an effort to remove these decisions from the OTP's direct
control.
Prosecutor's practice of obtaining self-referrals from states as a preferable alternative to
initiating proprio motu investigations. For an overview of how this worked with respect to
Kenya, see generally Hansen, supra note 76.
101. Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors, Eighth United Nations Congress on the
Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1 (1990),
available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Professionallnterest/prosecutors.pdf;
see
generally Danner, supra note 16; Hitomi Takemura, Reconsidering the Meaning and Actuality
of the Legitimacy of the InternationalCriminal Court, 4 AMSTERDAM L.F. 3, 7 (2012); Nsereko,
supra note 11, at 143.
102. See supra 101.
103. David Luban, Fairness to Rightness: Jurisdiction, Legality, and the Legitimacy of
InternationalCriminal Law, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 569, 579 (Samantha

Besson & John Tasiolas eds., 2010); Nienke Grossman, Legitimacy and International
Adjudicative Bodies, 51 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 107, 110 (2009); see also Danner,supra note
16, at 511 ("[G]ood process should include the public articulation of prosecutorial guidelines
that will shape and constrain his discretionary decisions.").
104. Arato, supra note 75, at 629; see generally Knoops, supra note 76.
105. Greenawalt, supra note 16, at 650 (discussing case selection, but the same point could
be made perhaps even more compellingly with respect to the selection of situations); deGuzman
& Schabas, Initiation of Investigations, supra note 28, at 52-53 ("A criminal court that is
perceived as selecting situations and/or cases randomly, inconsistently, unfairly, or otherwise
inappropriately will lose legitimacy in the eyes of relevant stakeholders and the public at
large.").
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IV. LEVERAGING THE FLEXIBILITY OF ARTICLE 53
A. FindingRoom to Interpret Within Statutory Factors
In independently deciding what the criteria established by article 53
should mean in the first place, the Prosecutor has leveraged the
flexibility of the text to assert discretion within those criteria. She has
capitalized on the substantive flexibility of concepts such as gravity to
find the necessary discretion within rather than outside the criteria
established by article 53.106 The resulting decision-making is therefore
tied to particular statutory requirements.
Although this appears to be a step back from an unbridled assertion
of discretion, its consequences are still significant. In practice, this
manifestation of discretion enables the Prosecutor to set priorities and
narrow the range of proprio motu situations potentially within her
investigative reach. The Prosecutor does not have statutory authority to
decide to focus her proprio motu activities on instances of post-election
violence in Africa, as opposed to on other contexts, no matter how
compelling or justifiable her reasons or goals for doing so.' 0 7 The
pervasive "Court for Africa" critiques mounted by the African Union
and others, and the related refusals by state parties to cooperate with the
Court in enforcement matters, all demonstrate the costs of such a policy
even being perceived, much less admitted. 08 Any attempt to more
blatantly express such preferences would likely yield further charges of
illegitimacy and selectivity.109 Yet, the Prosecutor seems to have
implemented exactly these policy priorities in practice.o In doing so,
the Prosecutor did not attempt to claim special authority to prioritize
post-election violence in Africa as a context where international crimes
may be especially destabilizing. Rather, the Prosecutor simply argued
that the situations in Kenya and Cote d'Ivoire satisfied her
interpretations of the requirements of article 53. "'
106. On the flexibility of the criteria established by article 53, see, e.g., deGuzman &
Schabas, Initiation of Investigations, supra note 28, at 21 ("Two aspects of the 'reasonable
basis' analysis appear to afford the Prosecutor considerable discretion in selecting situations to
prosecute - the determination of gravity and the interests ofjustice.").
107. See generally Kenya Request for Investigation, supra note 20; Cote d'Ivoire Request
for Investigation, supra note 20.
108. For example, the African Union has vigorously contested the Court's actions,
especially with respect to the indictment of Sudanese President Omar Hassan Al Bashir, and it
has openly advocated a policy of non-compliance. See generally African Union Press Release
No. 002/2012 (Jan. 9, 2012), availableat http://www.issafrica.org/anicj/uploads/Decisions-of
Pre-TrialChamberI -ofthe ICC.pdf.
109. McDonald & Haveman, supra note 28, at 3; Danner, supra note 16, at 521.
110. I am grateful to Polina Levina for making this point.
111. See generally Kenya Request for Investigation, supra note 20; Cote d'Ivoire Request
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On the one hand, this practice may suggest that the Prosecutor is
engaging in ultra vires policy-making by another name. On the other
hand, it would be difficult to argue that any proprio motu decision the
Prosecutor has made to date is either inconsistent with the criteria
established by article 53 or extra-legal. Rather, as this Article will show,
the legal criteria have proven to be sufficiently flexible and
accommodating to allow the Prosecutor to identify and advance
particular investigative priorities over others. While leveraging the
indeterminacy of the statutory criteria in this way might seem
illegitimate, the Prosecutor's actions still appear to fall within the
statutory framework."12
B. The Power to Decide Not to Act Yet
The Court has an express mission to combat impunity for the most
serious international crimes.1 13 Yet, the complementary posture of the
Court makes clear that the OTP is not expected to prosecute all such
crimes itself, as the Court is an institution of last resort. While the Rome
Statute affirms a strong presumption in favor of prosecution of
international crimes, that presumption is not limited to the Court; rather,
it affirms the primary obligation of states with jurisdiction over
international crimes to investigate and prosecute them.1 4 Still, as
history has frequently demonstrated, states do not always fulfill their
obligations to investigate and prosecute international crimes within their
jurisdictions, especially without external impetus to do so."
Within this context, the proprio motu power becomes potentially
catalytic; it enables the Prosecutor to leverage "the shadow of the
Court" and spur hesitant states to act by establishing a backstop to statetolerated impunity. In practice, the Prosecutor has attempted to do
exactly that through the strategy of proactive complementarity, or
encouraging states that have jurisdiction over particular crimes to
commence domestic proceedings. Proactive complementarity enables
the Prosecutor to engage with such states after the OTP finds an absence
of domestic proceedings with respect to crimes within the Court's
for Investigation,supra note 20.
112. Arato, supra note 75, at 630 ("Illegitimacy and injustice should not be confused with
illegality: perhaps even more importantly, legality alone does not necessarily render an action
legitimate or just.").
113. Rome Statute, supra note 2, pmbl.
114. Dan Sarooshi, Prosecutorial Policy and the International Criminal Court
Prosecutor'sProprioMotu Action or Self-Denial, 2 J. INT. CRIM. JUST. 940, 940 (2004) (arguing
that the Statute reaffirms a presumption for investigation and prosecution at the domestic level).
115. Burke-White, supra note 80, at 69; cf Rastan, supra note 69, at 595-96 (arguing that
the complementary requirement sharply restricts the prosecutor's reach, thus limiting the
Court's caseload only to those situations where true impunity persists).
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However, the Court has explicitly held that the
jurisdiction."
Prosecutor is free to proceed in the face of domestic inaction.' " At the
point such proactive efforts take place, therefore, the situation in
question already satisfies the requirements of article 53 and is
admissible before the Court.
A critical underpinning of proactive complementarity is leveraging
the potential stick of proprio motu action to motivate an inactive state to
take domestic action. The OTP will only take its own action if the state
subsequently fails to do so." 8 Maximizing the catalytic potential of the
proprio motu power through proactive complementarity thus requires at
least some degree of prosecutorial discretion with regard to the
identification of situations by the OTP." 9 This strategy requires the
Prosecutor to independently assess whether a presently unwilling or
unable state could become willing and able to act in the near future. The
Prosecutor has the power to independently select the criteria to rely
upon when making these assessments and the authority to decide how
long to wait before initiating proprio motu proceedings if a state does
not demonstrate sufficient indications of willingness and ability to act.
This kind of proprio motu decision-making requires discretion
inasmuch as it relies on the Prosecutor's independent and at least
somewhat subjective assessment of which currently inactive states
might be more or less likely to take genuine action in the future.
Proactive complementarity at a minimum allows the Prosecutor to
delay proprio motu proceedings and give the relevant state the
opportunity to act. However, the Prosecutor cannot find such discretion
within the text of article 53. At the same time, the Prosecutor avoids
asserting an extra-statutory power by simply deferring the formal
116. Burke-White, supra note 80, at 56; Activities 2012, supra note 40 (referring to
complementary efforts with Columbia and Guinea).
117. Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/-4-01/07, Judgment on the Appeal of Mr.
Germain Katanga against the Oral Decision of Trial Chamber II of 12 June 2009 on the
Admissibility of the Case, 78 (Sept. 25, 2010), availableat http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/
doc746819.pdf [hereinafter Katanga Appeals Decision].
77-79 (describing how the Prosecutor
118. Draft Policy Paper, supra note 15,
announced the intention to open a proprio motu investigation into the situation in the
Democratic Republic of Congo if the DRC failed to refer the situation to the Court under article
14); see generally Katanga Appeals Decision, supra note 117; see also Burke-White, supra note
80, at 69. The Court has repeatedly held that domestic inaction presents no complementarity bar
regardless of theoretical or potential domestic capacity and/or willingness to act. For an example
of how proactive complementarity strategies work in practice, see the Prosecutor's description
of the developments in the situation in Colombia, where OTP engagement spurred domestic
efforts. See generally Activities 2011, supra note 62; Activities 2012, supra note 40. Thomas
Obel Hansen chronicles how proactive efforts failed to yield domestic proceedings and how
proprio motu action was taken as a result in the situation in Kenya. See generally Hansen, supra
note 76.
119. See generally Burke-White, supra note 80.
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determination about whether the requirements of article 53 are satisfied.
In doing so, the Prosecutor capitalizes on the OTP's significant
autonomy over preliminary examinations to either extend or compress
the timeline between the assessment of a situation and the decision
about whether or not to proceed based on an independent judgment
about whether proactive complementarity might be successful in a given
instance.
C. The OpportunisticallyFlexible Gravity Determination
Looking at the Prosecutor's proprio motu decisions in aggregate,
gravity emerges both as a decisive factor justifying the Prosecutor's
actions and as an exceptionally flexible concept.120 To date, the
Prosecutor has often relied on gravity to either justify proprio motu
action or explain inaction.121 Yet, as the Prosecutor observes, "the
[Rome] Statute and the Rules [of Procedure and Evidence] do not define
the admissibility criterion of gravity."' 22 As such, gravity can be
interpreted in many different and plausible ways, with multiple aspects
of the concept remaining ambiguous and flexible.' 23
One significant ambiguity relates to the factors informing the gravity
analysis. The Regulations of the OTP provide the most specific
guidance on the gravity interpretation, identifying four non-exhaustive
120. See generally Iraq Communications, supra note 20; see also Fabricio Guariglia, The
Selection of Cases by the OTP, in THE EMERGING PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL

COURT 209, 213-14 (Carsten Stahn & Goran Sluiter eds., 2009); Schabas, supra note 2, at 544;
Danner, supra note 16, at 544; deGuzman, Choosing to Prosecute, supra note 9, at 281;
deGuzman, Gravity, supra note 29, at 1403.
121. Rome Statute, supra note 2, pmbl.; see generally Iraq Communications, supra note
20; REPORT OF THE PROSECUTOR OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, Second Assembly of

States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Sept. 8, 2003); Kenya
Requestfor Investigation,supra note 20, if 51, 107; Kenya Decision,supra note 34, f 50, 182,
188; Referrals and Communications, supra note 15; Statement by Ocampo, supra note 18, at 89; Office of the Prospector, Report on the Activities Performed During the First Three Years,
supra note 18, at 6-7 (arguing that the situations in the Democratic Republic of Congo and
Uganda were the gravest within the Court's jurisdiction); Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Statement by
the ChiefProsecutoron the Uganda Arrest Warrants (Oct. 14, 2005).
122. Draft Policy Paper, supra note 15,
68; see also Markus Benzing, The
Complementarity Regime of the International Criminal Court: International Criminal Justice
Between State Sovereignty and the FightAgainst Impunity, 7 MAx PLANCK YEARBOOK OF U.N.
LAW 591, 619 (2003) ("The meaning of 'sufficient gravity' is not defined by the Statute and will
have to be developed over time.").
123. See, e.g., deGuzman & Schabas, Initiation of Investigations, supra note 28, at 56
("[T]here is no universal understanding of the concept of gravity.... No system surveyed
employs a rigid or mandatory set of factors for determining gravity."); deGuzman, Gravity,
supra note 29, at 1401 ("[Dlespite the acknowledged centrality of gravity to international
criminal law, there is virtually no discussion in academic or judicial sources of the theoretical
basis and doctrinal contours of this concept.").
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factors of scale, nature, manner of commission, and impact of the
crimes.124 While the Court has affirmed that both quantitative and
qualitative factors are relevant to the gravity determination, it has
rejected calls to provide more concrete guidance.1 25 Consequently,
many critical questions about how these factors should be interpreted
remain unresolved: whether they are to be hierarchically prioritized or
co-equal; whether each must be satisfied independently above a
particular threshold, and if so, what that threshold is, and who sets it; or
whether instead an exceptionally strong showing in one can mitigate a
deficiency in another.
A second ambiguity is whether or not the Prosecutor must consider
relative as well as absolute gravity when evaluating the admissibility of
a situation. Article 53 requires the Prosecutor to consider the
admissibility factors specified in article 17 when deciding whether to
initiate an investigation.126 Article 17(1)(d), in turn, requires a situation
to be of sufficient gravity to be admissible before the Court.' 2 7 This
provision clearly imposes an additional threshold beyond the gravity
inherent in the crimes prohibited by the Statute.12 8 However, what
remains uncertain is whether this additional threshold is absolute or
relative-whether, in other words, the Prosecutor must only analyze a
particular situation in isolation to determine whether it is sufficiently
grave, or whether instead the Prosecutor must compare the gravity of
one situation in relation to others potentially admissible before the
Court.12 9 The Prosecutor adopted both absolute and relative gravity
analyses in prior proprio motu decisions, and, as the Court has not yet
clarified which standard should control, she appears free to continue to
do so in the future.
These ambiguities open the door to divergent conclusions about
whether a situation is sufficiently grave. A situation may satisfy the four
gravity factors of scale, nature, manner of commission, and impact, but
it may still be arguably less grave than other potential situations before
the Court. A situation may also involve crimes that are especially grave
by some factors but not nearly as grave with respect to others. The point
of this Article is not to duplicate existing debates about the proper
124. See generally Regulations of the Office ofthe Prosecutor,supra note 35, Reg. 29(1).
125. Kenya Decision,supra note 34, In 56-57.
126. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 53.
127. Id. art. 17(1)(d). While the provision refers to a case, the Court has repeatedly held
that it also applies to assessments of whole situations. See, e.g., Kenya Decision, supra note 34.
128. Kenya Decision, supra note 34, T 56 ("[AIll crimes that fall within the subject-matter
jurisdiction of the Court are serious, and thus, the reference to the insufficiency of gravity is
actually an additional safeguard, which prevents the Court from investigating, prosecuting and
trying peripheral cases.").
129. For the contours of the debate in scholarship, compare deGuzman & Schabas,
InitiationofInvestigations,supra note 28, at 22, with Rastan, supra note 69, at 597-99.
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meaning of gravity or argue in favor of or against a particular
interpretation. Rather, the relevant point is that the flexibility and
breadth of the gravity determination accommodates multiple and
potentially inconsistent interpretations, and that the Prosecutor has
claimed independent and primary authority to decide which
interpretation to apply in each situation under proprio motu
consideration. The combination of flexibility of criteria and interpretive
autonomy enables the Prosecutor to assert a significant degree of
discretion in her proprio motu decision-making.
1. Prioritizing Gravity Factors
Taken together, the gravity factors repeatedly identified by the OTP
(scale, nature of the crimes, manner of commission, and impact) capture
many different aspects of gravity, illuminating the breadth and diversity
of the concept. The scale of the crimes involves an analysis of
the number of direct and indirect victims, the extent of the
damage caused by the crimes, in particular the bodily or
psychological harm caused to the victims and their families, and
their geographical or temporal spread (intensity of the crimes
over a brief period or low intensity violence over an extended
period) . . .
The nature of the crimes involves "the specific elements of each
offence such as killings, rapes and other crimes involving sexual or
gender violence and crimes committed against children, or the
imposition of conditions of life on a community calculated to bring
about its destruction."' 3 1 The manner of commission of the crimes
involves
the means employed to execute the crime, the degree of
participation and intent in [their] commission, the extent to which
the crimes were systematic or result[ed] from a plan or organized
policy or otherwise resulted from the abuse of power or official
capacity, and elements of particular cruelty, including the
vulnerability of the victims, any motives involving
discrimination, or the use of rape and sexual violence as a means
of destroying communities. 32
Analyzing the impact of the crimes involves examining the
130.
131.
132.

Draft Policy Paper,supra note 15,
Id. 70(b).
Id. 70(c).
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"consequence [of the crimes] on the local or international community,
including the long term social, economic and environmental damage;
crimes committed with the aim or consequence of increasing the
vulnerability of civilians; or other acts the prima 7 purpose of which is
to spread terror among the civilian population."' These factors make
clear that situations can be grave in many different ways. In addition,
the factors themselves contain many potential areas of overlap, further
illuminating the relatively amorphous nature of the concept and the
difficulty of concretizing a definitive ex ante interpretive framework.
When examining the Prosecutor's propriomotu decisions, the many
potential applications of these factors become clear. In the application to
open an investigation into the situation in Kenya, the Prosecutor cited
each of the four gravity factors without establishing any hierarchy
among them or clarifying whether each factor had to be established
above a particular threshold. 134 In contrast, in the application to open an
investigation into the situation in Cote d'Ivoire, the Prosecutor cited the
factors of scale and manner of commission of the crimes committed, but
did not expressly make findings regarding their nature or impact.13 5 This
133. Id. 70(d).
134. Kenya Request for Investigation, supra note 20,
56-59 (In Kenya, the Prosecutor
described the scale of the crimes as follows: between 1133 and 1200 killings, 900 rapes,
350,000 persons internally displaced, and 3561 acts causing serious injury. The Prosecutor
further characterized the crimes as being "organized and planned within the context of a
widespread and systematic attack against selected segments of the Kenyan civilian population.
Groups, and persons belonging to these groups, have been stigmatized and deliberately targeted
on the basis of distinctive ethnic features and/or presumed political affiliations." The Prosecutor
described the manner of commission as exceptionally brutal, noting
[p]erpetrators often crudely cut off body parts, attacked civilians with any
possible sharp pointed objects. . . and terrorized the whole communities by
installing check points were [sic] the perpetrators "selected" the victims based
on their ethnicity and hacked them to death. There were incidents of burning of
people alive. In addition, occurrence of gang rape and genital mutilation, forced
circumcision and penile amputation was reported during the period.
Finally, the Prosecutor cited the impact of the crimes as significant and devastating:
[v]ictims of sexual violence, who often suffered grave physical injury, suffer
from enormous psychological trauma, may have been infected with HIV/AIDS
and/or other types of sexually transmissible diseases, are often abandoned by
their husbands and/or families and suffer from social stigma. Women and
children who lost family members and property, and who had been chased
away from their homes are a highly vulnerable population in need of special
attention. The displaced persons, who have been forcibly evicted, have lost not
only their home but much of their very existence.
Id.
135.

Cote d'Ivoire Request for Investigation, supra note 20,
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silence suggests, but does not definitively establish, that the Prosecutor
might have found the demonstration of only two factors sufficient to
satisfy the gravity requirement, even without considering the remaining
factors.
In both applications to initiate proprio motu investigations, the
Prosecutor relied on qualitative as well as quantitative gravity factors.' 36
In contrast, the Prosecutor justified the decision not to proceed with
respect to the situation in Iraq based on a strictly quantitative analysis of
gravity.' 3 7 The analysis of the gravity of the situation in Iraq did not
even contemplate any additional, non-quantitative factors. 38 This
analytical silence suggests that scale might function as a threshold that
any analysis of crimes must satisfy. It further implies that even an
extremely strong demonstration of the other gravity factors could not
cure the quantitative deficiency. Yet, while it echoes other emphases
made by the Prosecutor on the importance of scale to the gravity
assessment, 139 such an implication appears to contradict the
Prosecutor's prior assertion that the gravity factors "should be
considered jointly; no fixed weight should be assigned to the criteria,
described the scale of the crimes as follows: "at least 3000 persons were killed, 72 persons
disappeared, 520 persons were subject to arbitrary arrest and detentions, and ... over 100
reported cases of rape, while the number of unreported incidents is believed to be considerably
higher." The Prosecutor then described the manner of commission of the crimes committed as
serious, both by themselves and because they "have been committed on a large-scale, as part of
a plan or in furtherance of a policy, or in the context or association with an armed conflict [and
because] [m]any of these crimes were committed with cruelty and on ethnic, religious or
politically discriminatory grounds.").
136. Kenya Request for Investigation, supra note 20; Cote d'Ivoire Request for
Investigation, supra note 20.
137. Iraq Communications,supra note 20, at 8-9.
138. Hansen, supra note 76, at 198, 199. Comparethe Prosecutor's reasoning in the OTP's
Iraq Communications, supra note 20, with Kenya Request for Investigation, supra note 20, and
Cote de'Ivoire Investigation, supra note 20. Hansen also notes the divergent gravity
interpretations in Kenya and Iraq, observing that "[the] departure [in the Kenya application]
from earlier prosecutorial practice [in the Iraq decision] appears to be more consistent with the
[Pirosecutor's stated understanding of gravity." Hansen, supra note 76, at 199.
139. See, e.g., Statement by Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Informal Meeting ofLegal Advisors of
Ministries of Foreign Affairs, ICC-02/04-01/05-67, (Oct. 24, 2005) available at http://www.
iclklamberg.com/Caselaw/Uganda/Konyetal/PTCII/ICC-02-04-01-05-67_English.pdf, at 6.
We are currently in the process of refining our methodologies for assessing
gravity. In particular, there are several factors that must be considered. The
most obvious of these is the number of persons killed - as this tends to be the
most reliably reported. However, we will not necessarily limit our
investigations to situations where killing has been the predominant crime. We
also look at number of victims of other crimes, especially crimes against
physical integrity.
Id.
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but rather a judgment will have to be reached on the facts and
circumstances of each situation."' 40
The Iraq decision stands in further contrast to the Prosecutor's
decision to place the situation in the Republic of Korea under
preliminary examination. In its entirety, this situation involved the
killing of four people and the injuring of another sixty-six.141 While
there are still more victims in this situation than in the situation in Iraq,
the difference is extremely small, especially compared to the scale of
crimes committed in other situations before the Court.142 The obvious
rebuttal to this criticism is that the preliminary examination stage is
inherently preliminary; that it is a necessary initial evaluative step for
the Prosecutor to determine whether a situation satisfies the
requirements of article 53. Indeed, the Prosecutor has not suggested any
intent to open a proprio motu investigation into the situation in the
Republic of Korea. However, the Prosecutor affirmatively placed the
situation in the Republic of Korea under preliminary examination after
issuing the declination to proceed in the situation in Iraq.14 3 Other
situations around the world involving crimes potentially within the
Court's jurisdiction have not been so affirmatively identified by the
OTP.144 It would seem to be a strange choice for the Prosecutor to take
such an affirmative step with respect to a situation that was obviously
insufficiently grave based on the OTP's prior decisions.
The Prosecutor's declination to proceed with respect to the situation
in Iraq also illuminates the impact of weighing the four gravity factors
in different ways. The Iraq decision illustrates how the choice to
interpret gravity based on particular criteria and not others can often
determine the ultimate conclusion about whether a situation is
sufficiently grave. 145 For example, the crimes of willful killing and
140. See generally Regulationsof the Office of the Prosecutor,supra note 35, Reg. 29(1).
141. Activities 2011, supra note 62, 47.
142. See, e.g., deGuzman, Choosing to Prosecute,supra note 9, at 285.
143. Activities 2012, supra note 40.
144. If the situation in Korea, with so few victims, is even potentially within the Court's
investigative reach, presumably many other instances of violence affecting comparable numbers
of victims could be as well.
145. Compare the Prosecutor's analyses of the situations in Uganda and the Democratic
Republic of Congo as the "most grave" situations facing the Court in the response to
communications concerning the situation in Iraq, the Prosecutor's analyses of the situations in
Kenya and Cote d'lvoire of grave enough in isolation in the applications for authorization to
open investigations pursuant to article 15 in those situations, and the Prosecutor's analysis of the
situation in Iraq, finding the scale of the crimes within the Court's jurisdiction to be of a
different order than other situations before the Court. See generally Kenya Request for
Investigation, supra note 20; Cote d'Ivoire Request for Investigation, supra note 20; Iraq
Communications, supra note 20; see also deGuzman, Gravity, supra note 29, at 1431;
deGuzman & Schabas, Initiation of Investigations, supra note 28, at 22; Schabas, supra note 2,
at 548.
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inhuman treatment are exceptionally serious, generally seen as more so
than the crime of conscripting child solders, which ultimately emerged
as the focus of the investigations and prosecutions within the situation
in the Democratic Republic of Congo. 6 The devastating and long-term
impact of inhuman treatment on victims has also been wellchronicled.147 Yet, the number of victims within the Court's jurisdiction
in Iraq is exceptionally small.148 Once the Prosecutor decided to rely
primarily on the scale of the crimes committed, it became virtually
impossible for the situation in Iraq to be found to be sufficiently grave
because the number of victims within the Court's limited jurisdiction
was so low.
2. Relative and Absolute Gravity
To date, the Prosecutor has invoked both concepts of relative and
absolute gravity when justifying proprio motu decisions. For example,
in declining to proceed with respect to the situation in Iraq, the
Prosecutor compared the number of victims in that situation to the
numbers of victims in the situations in the Democratic Republic of
Congo and Uganda to find the former insufficiently grave.149 Similarly,
in earlier statements, the Prosecutor affirmed, "the Office independently
selected the situations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)
and Northern Uganda as the gravest admissible situations under the
jurisdiction of the Court."' 5 0 In a more recent policy paper, the OTP
again reaffirmed the importance of relative gravity, observing "[u]pon
taking office, the Prosecutor conducted a review of information on
crimes collected under article 15. The Office identified the situations in
the DRC, Uganda and Colombia as containin the gravest occurrence of
crimes within [the Court's] . . . jurisdiction." 1 Such statements suggest
146. The first three prosecutions by the Court addressed the issue of child soldier
conscription, among other charges. See, e.g., The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dylio, Case
No. ICC-01/04-01/06; The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07; The
Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/12.
147. The Prosecutor analyzed the situations in Iraq, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of
Congo, and Uganda under a relative gravity analysis. In contrast, the Prosecutor has analyzed
the situations in Kenya and Cote d'Ivoire under an absolute gravity analysis.
148. See, e.g., Schabas, supra note 2, at 546.
149. Iraq Communications,supra note 20, at 8-9.
150. Schabas, supra note 2, at 544 (emphasis added). It should be noted that in both
situations, the Prosecutor was subsequently able to obtain article 14 referrals by the states in
question for the situations. However, the Prosecutor expressed intent to open proprio motu
investigations into those situations if the relevant states did not refer the situations to the Court.
151. Draft Policy Paper,supra note 15, 57. The situation in Colombia remains under
preliminary examination today for admissibility reasons: currently, the OTP has found domestic
proceedings to potentially constitute a complementarity bar. It therefore continues to monitor
the situation. See generallyActivities 2012, supra note 40.
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that the Prosecutor views article 53 as requiring a comparative analysis
to determine whether a situation is graver than others and potentially of
interest to the Court.152
In other contexts, however, most notably in the applications to open
investigations proprio motu in the situations in Kenya and Cote
d'Ivoire, the Prosecutor implied instead that article 53 only required an
absolute gravity analysis. 53 In these applications, the Prosecutor
assessed the gravity of each situation in isolation, without comparing
that situation to others potentially or actually before the Court.154 The
Prosecutor moreover did not justify the decision to open investigations
into Kenya and Cote d'Ivoire as opposed to investigating one of the
other situations under preliminary examination, based on gravity or any
other factor.15 5 Such a framework would be warranted under a relative
gravity analysis, as the situations under preliminary examination
constitute a clear set of potential alternative options for proprio motu
action. However, it would be irrelevant to the absolute gravity of each
situation.
Especially in conjunction with the Prosecutor's authority to pick and
choose from among the four gravity factors, the decision about whether
to employ a relative or absolute gravity analysis has a potentially
determinative impact on the ultimate conclusion about whether or not a
situation is sufficiently grave. For example, the situation in Afghanistan,
under preliminary examination at the time of the Kenya application and
remaining so today, involved greater numbers of victims for arguably
the more serious crimes of murder and torture than did the situation in
Kenya.156 At the same time, the situation in Kenya could be considered
152. Some scholars also advocate for a relative gravity standard. See generally Schabas,
supra note 2 (criticizing the Prosecutor for not demonstrating why the situation in Kenya was
more grave than others potentially before the Court); see also deGuzman, Gravity, supra note
29, at 1403 ("In addition to considering the gravity threshold, the Statute's emphasis on gravity
strongly suggests the Prosecutor should consider relative gravity in selecting among situations
and cases above the threshold.").
153. For this reason, Schabas argues that gravity is "invoked not so much as ajustification
for the selection of cases on which to proceed as a justification for refusing to undertake other
cases." Schabas refers to "cases," but the same point seems applicable to entire situations,
particularly as Schabas refers to the entire situation in Iraq to make this point. See Schabas,
ProsecutorialDiscretion and Gravity, in THE EMERGING PRACTICE OF THE ICC, supra note 76, at

234.
154. Schabas, supra note 2, at 544; see generally Kenya Request for Investigation, supra
note 20; Cote d'Ivoire Requestfor Investigation,supra note 20.
155. Compare Schabas, supra note 2, with Rastan, supra note 69 (arguing about whether
such a comparison would be necessary under article 53).
156. Activities 2011, supra note 62, at 6-8; Activities 2012, supra note 40, at 7-10. See
also Afghanistan, INT'L CRIMINAL CoURT, http://www.icc-cpi.int/enmenus/icc/structure%20
of/o20the%20court/office%20Of/o20the%20prosecutor/comm%20and%20ref/pe-ongoing/afg
hannistan/Pages/afghanistan.aspx; U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS
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graver based on other factors-for example, by looking at the scale of
crimes such as displacement of population, and arguing that those
crimes may in fact exert a broader and more devastating impact than did
the instances of torture and willful killing in Afghanistan. The analysis
of the situation in Iraq provides another relevant example. Looking
solely at the scale of the crimes, the Prosecutor found the situation in
Iraq to involve crimes "of a different order" of magnitude than those in
other situations before the Court.' 57 The combination of the
Prosecutor's sole focus on the gravity factor of scale and the reliance on
a relative gravity analysis led to the inevitable conclusion that the
situation in Iraq was inadmissible.' 5 8 Such a conclusion may not,
however, have been nearly as inevitable if gravity were assessed, as it
was by the Prosecutor in the situations in Kenya and Cote d'Ivoire, by
looking at qualitative as well as quantitative factors and by conducting
an absolute rather than a relative gravity analysis.1 59
D. Independence-Plus:Maximizing the Impact ofDiscretion Through
StatutorilyEnshrinedIndependence
Article 15 clearly allows the Prosecutor, with judicial review, to
independently trigger the Court's jurisdiction.160
However,
PRACTICES FOR 2011: AFGHANISTAN, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/186669.pdf
(published annually); AFG. INDEP. HUMAN RIGHTS COMM'N, INSURGENT ABUSES AGAINST
AFGHAN CIVILIANS (2008), http://www.aihrc.org.af/media/files/Research%20Reports/english/
Enganti G.pdf; INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CRoss, ICRC REPORT ON THE TREATMENT OF
FOURTEEN "HIGH VALUE DETAINEES" IN CIA CUSTODY (2007) [hereinafter ICRC REPORT], at
http://www.nybooks.com/media/doc/2010/04/22/icrc-report.pdf.
157. Iraq Communications, supra note 20, at 8-9.
158. Id. deGuzman makes this point with respect to case selection, but it is also quite
relevant for situations as the Iraq decision demonstrates. See deGuzman, Gravity,supra note 29,
at 1460 ("The majority of cases that present themselves as viable prosecutorial options ... will
score high on some of the gravity factors and lower on others. In those cases, the Prosecutor
must decide which factors and goals he considers most important.").
159. See, e.g, Schabas, ProsecutorialDiscretion and Gravity, supra note 153, in THE
EMERGING PRACTICE OF THE ICC, supra note 76, at 245 ("The fundamentally quantitative
approach to gravity suggested by the Prosecutor in the Lord's Resistance Army arrest warrants
and the Iraq situation also seems to neglect an important dimension of the crimes.... is not the
fact that the crimes are attributable to the State germane to the [analysis]?").
160. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 15. See also Schabas, supra note 2, at 541 (observing
that under the Rome Statute, "for the first time we have an international criminal tribunal where
the choice of situations for prosecutions is the prerogative of a judicial official within the
institution and not a political body outside it"); ROD RASTAN, THE POWER OF THE PROSECUTOR IN
INITIATING INVESTIGATIONS (2007).
What became known as the exercise of proprio motu powers by the Prosecutor
was widely seen as a vital test for the independence of the ICC. The aim was to
ensure the truth-seeking dimension of the Court by guaranteeing that the
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independence does not automatically confer discretion. 6 1 An
independent prosecutor could certainly interpret the statutory factors
arguing for or against proprio motu action. Yet, in addition to analyzing
statutory criteria, the Prosecutor also claims authority to decide which
criteria should be relevant to a particular gravity determination, and to
select from among various plausible interpretations in different
contexts. The Prosecutor may or may not have discretion to decide
whether to open an investigation into a situation once she determines
the requirements of article 53 are satisfied. However, she at a minimum
has seized the power to interpret the concept of gravity independently
and flexibly. As a consequence, the Prosecutor retains, at least in the
context of proprio motu decision-making, significant authority to define
the concept of gravity.
While it is generally accepted that an action taken outside of
established statutory limits is unconstitutional and invalid, inherent
ambiguity within many statutory grants of power often makes it difficult
to ascertain which actions fall outside the scope of those limits. 162
making proprio motu decisions, the Prosecutor capitalizes on such
ambiguities inherent in the statutorily undefined concept of gravity to
justify particular conclusions without expressly claiming selection
discretion or advancing a policy agenda about which situations or
contexts are most deserving of the Court's attention.1 6 3 Because
weighing and prioritizing criteria in different ways can result in
different and even opposite conclusions about whether a situation is
Prosecutor would not be restricted in his ability to gather, receive, and act on
information.
Id.
161. The Prosecutor has emphasized the crucial distinction between the two concepts in
suggesting that the proprio motu is independent but not discretionary. Kenya Request for
Investigation, supra note 20, 45 (noting that the Prosecutor determines whether there is a
reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation under article 15(3)). Article 15(3) says that if
the Prosecutor finds a reasonable basis that she shall submit the situation to the Pre-Trial
Chamber for authorization. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 15(3). See also deGuzman &
Schabas, Initiationof Investigations,supra note 28, at 143 ("[T] he current prosecutor, as well as
some commentators have interpreted the statute to require the Prosecutor to proceed with a
proprio motu request whenever a reasonable basis exists."); Regulations of the Office of the
Prosecutor, supra note 35, Reg. 29(1); Draft Policy Paper,supra note 15, IT 76, 83; Fatou
Bensouda, Prosecutor-elect of the International Criminal Court, Introductory Remarks at the
International Conference: 10 years review of the ICC. Justice for All?, (Feb. 15 2012), available
at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/910OBD4B-OFEF-4209-998D-1 C453F187DB/O/Introd
uctoryremarksSydneyconferenceAustraliaAfricalessons.pdf.
162. See, e.g., Arato, supra note 75, at 629.
163. deGuzman & Schabas, Initiation of Investigations, supra note 28, at 144 ("Two
aspects of the 'reasonable basis' analysis appear to afford the Prosecutor considerable discretion
in selecting situations to prosecute-the determination of gravity and the interests of justice.").
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sufficiently grave, the power to select from among interpretations
strongly resembles discretion to decide whether a particular situation
should come before the Court.
The Prosecutor's gravity interpretations are not merely independent.
Rather, they are also primary. The Court can only exercise a fairly
limited review of these decisions. This is not to diminish the fact that
the Pre-Trial Chamber must authorize the initiation of any propriomotu
investigation-to be sure, this requirement ensures that the Prosecutor
defend her analysis of a situation to the Court,' 64 thus enabling the PreTrial Chamber to act as a check against erroneous or unreasonable
conclusions by the Prosecutor.' 6 5 Yet, these more robust forms of
judicial review over some aspects of proprio motu decision-making do
not compensate for gaps with respect to others. Rather, the scope of PreTrial Chamber review preserves significant space for the Prosecutor to
deploy discretion through the gravity determination.166
The Pre-Trial Chamber is only charged with reviewinf applications
by the Prosecutor to open investigations proprio motu.16 It cannot, in
contrast, review declinations to proceed, unless those decisions are
based on the interests of justice. Therefore, the Pre-Trial Chamber
does not review the Prosecutor's interpretations of the other criteria
imposed by article 53-reasonable basis, complementarity, and
gravity-when the Prosecutor finds that those criteria are not satisfied
in a given situation. The drafting history of the provision suggests
potential reasons for this gap in judicial review. Debates about the
proprio motu power focused largely on the initiation of proceedings
rather than on declinations to proceed.169 Much effort was made to
balance concerns by opponents of the provision that the proprio motu
power would not simply fuel a rogue Prosecutor with priorities of
proponents that the provision guarantee prosecutorial independence

164. Id. at 153 (arguing that this review enables the Chamber to "play a critical role in
reviewing any prosecutorial efforts to initiate an investigation proprio motu").
165. Danner, supra note 16, at 514-15.
166. Cf deGuzman, Choosing to Prosecute, supra note 9, at 275 ("Although in the first
instance selections are a matter of the prosecutor's discretion, the judges will have the last word
in some cases, such as when they disagree with the Prosecutor about the interests of justice.").
deGuzman is not inaccurate-the Court does indeed have the last word in some cases. They do
not, however, have this word in particular areas where the Prosecutor can assert primary
authority to define interpretive rules with respect to gravity.
167. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 15.
168. Id. arts. 15, 53.
169. For a review of the salient debates during the drafting history, see, e.g., Morten
Bergsmo, The JurisdictionalRegime of the International Criminal Court, Part II, Articles 1119, 6 EuR. J. CRIME CRIM. L. & CRIM. JUST. 345, 355-57 (1998); Schabas, supra note 2, at 53940; Danner, supranote 16, at 513-15; Cote, supra note 95, at 353-54, 402-03.
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with regard to propriomotu decision-making.17 0 These concerns mostly
focused on governing or protecting the Prosecutor's power to initiate
proprio motu investigations,"'7 and there appears to have been
comparatively less concern with providing judicial review of the
Prosecutor's decision not to proceed based on a finding that the
remaining criteria established by article 53 were not satisfied.172 This
resulted in the Pre-Trial Chamber being unable to directly review the
Prosecutor's interpretations of the criteria supporting such a finding.
The Pre-Trial Chamber thus has not had occasion to evaluate the
reasonableness of either the Prosecutor's sole focus on the scale of the
alleged crimes or the choice of a relative gravity analysis in the Iraq
decision. In the face of this judicial silence, these interpretations
currently stand as at least theoretically co-equal alternatives to the
multi-factor analyses and choice of absolute gravity analyses in the
applications to open investigations into the situations in Kenya and Cote
d'Ivoire.
A second limitation lies in the standard of review the Pre-Trial
Chamber must apply to the Prosecutor's applications to initiate proprio
motu investigations. At that stage, the review of an application to
initiate an investigation proprio motu is "primarily a threshold setting
exercise designed to 'prevent unwarranted, frivolous, or politically
motivated investigations."' 73 The Prosecutor is only required to
demonstrate to the Pre-Trial Chamber that there is a reasonable basis to
proceed with respect to the particular situation." The Pre-Trial
Chamber has made two significant findings about this standard: first,
that given the necessarily preliminary nature of evidence and
information at this stage, the reasonable basis standard that the
Prosecutor must satisfy is "the lowest evidentiary standard provided for
75
in the Statute;""1
and second, that the Pre-Trial Chamber is to apply the
same reasonable basis standard as the Prosecutor in reviewing a request
for authorization to initiate an investigation.' 76 The Pre-Trial Chamber
170. See sources cited supra note 169.
171. Similar concerns about preventing the Prosecutor from making expressly political
decisions unchecked likely underpinned the provisions requiring judicial review of any finding
that an investigation would not be in the interests of justice.
172. For a review of the relevant drafting history, see, e.g., Danner, supra note 16, at 51315; Schabas, supra note 2, at 539-40.
173. Rod Rastan, The JurisdictionalScope ofSituations Before the InternationalCriminal
Court, 23 CRIM. L.F. 1, 26 (2012) (citing Situation in the Republic of Cote d'Ivoire, Case No.
ICC-02/11-14, Decision Pursuantto Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an
Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Cote d'Ivoire, 121 (Oct. 3, 2011) [hereinafter
Cote d'Ivoire Decision].
174. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 15; Kenya Decision, supranote 34, $ 21.
175. Kenya Decision,supra note 34, 27.
176. Id. 21.
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must therefore only satisfy itself that the Prosecutor's interpretation
reasonably points to the proffered conclusion.' 7 7 This low standard of
review does not appear to require a finding that any given interpretation
is consistent with prior prosecutorial statements or practice, or that it
would have been the preferred interpretation of the Pre-Trial Chamber.
Given the inherent flexibility of the gravity determination, this low
standard of review makes it difficult for the Pre-Trial Chamber to
rigorously evaluate the Prosecutor's reliance on a particular
interpretation of gravity. Looking more broadly, a firm consensus has
not developed about what makes particular crimes graver than others, or
how to prioritize quantitative and qualitative criteria. Rather, scholars
generally agree that "there is little [agreement], even among the Court's
supporters, about what makes crimes grave enough for international
attention, and even less about which crimes are the most deserving of
[limited] ICC resources."' 7 8 As such, the Prosecutor can meet this
standard of review by simply demonstrating that her particular gravity
interpretations are reasonable applications of the broad and
accommodating criteria established by the Court and the Regulations of
the OTP.179 As a result, the Pre-Trial Chamber remains crucially limited
in its efforts to review the Prosecutor's proprio motu decisionmaking.180

The phrase "reasonable basis to proceed" in paragraph 3 [of article 15]
regarding the Prosecutor's conclusion is reiterated in paragraph 4, which
governs the Chamber's review of the Prosecutor's Request. Exactly the same
language is also included in the opening clause of article 53(1) of the Statute.
Thus, these provisions prescribe the same standard to be considered both by the
Prosecutor and the Pre-Trial Chamber. In the Chamber's opinion, it would be
illogical . . . to advance the view that the scope of the "reasonable basis to
proceed" standard with respect to the Prosecutor is different than the one
required for the Chamber's consideration, notwithstanding that the same
language is used within the same or related articles and for the same purpose,
i.e., the opening of an investigation.
Id.
177. Id. % 34-35.
178. deGuzman, Choosing to Prosecute,supra note 9, at 269. deGuzman also notes "there
is no agreement on which cases cause the 'gravest harm' or involve 'the worst crimes.' As the
Prosecutor's policy acknowledges, harm can be measured on various dimensions." Id. at 288.
179. Bergsmo, supra note 169, at 355 ("[T]he test which the Pre-Trial Chamber is to apply
is one of reasonableness, not of appropriateness.").
180. Conceivably, the Prosecutor could have simply claimed express discretion to select
situations under the deliberately vague and clearly discretionary interests of justice
determination. However, in contrast to a finding of insufficient gravity, any determination that
an investigation will not be in the interests of justice is automatically reviewable by the PreTrial Chamber. See Webb, supra note 74, at 320 (Webb observes that the interests of justice
determination is unique because "any decision based on it will be fully discretionary"); Rastan,
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In practice, the reasonable basis standard further solidifies the
primacy of the Prosecutor's judgment regarding a particular situation.
For example, in its decision authorizing an investigation into the
situation in Kenya, a majority of the Pre-Trial Chamber reiterated the
Prosecutor's interpretations of the scale, nature, manner of commission,
and impact of the alleged crimes.181 The majority then emphasized two
of the four gravity factors-the scale and manner of commission of the
crimes-in finding the gravity requirement to be satisfied.1 8 2 The
majority did not explicitly grapple with the nature of the crimes or with
their impact, but nor did it challenge the Prosecutor's assertions on
these points. In its decision authorizing an investigation into the
situation in Cote d'Ivoire, the Pre-Trial Chamber accepted the
Prosecutor's findings regarding the scale and manner of commission of
the crimes, and affirmed that the situation was adequately grave based
on those findings.' 83 At the same time, the Pre-Trial Chamber did not
challenge or even address the Prosecutor's silence with respect to the
other two gravity factors of nature and impact of the crimes. 184 in
neither decision did the Pre-Trial Chamber evaluate the Prosecutor's
reliance on an absolute gravity analysis or note the inconsistency with
the OTP's relative gravity analysis in its prior declination to investigate
the situation in Iraq.
These decisions have various possible implications. They could
suggest that sufficient showings on only some factors may overcome
deficiencies with respect to others, or even (as implied by the Pre-Trial
supra note 69, at 598 (Rastan argues that "[t]he discretionary quality of this assessment is
pronounced by the last sentence of Article 53(1) and Article 53(3)(b) that stipulate that decisions
taken on the sole basis of the interests of justice may be reviewed by the Pre-Trial Chamber on
its own initiate and may be overturned"). See also deGuzman & Schabas, Initiation of
Investigations, supra note 28, at 144 ("Two aspects of the 'reasonable basis analysis appear to
afford the Prosecutor considerable discretion in selecting situations to prosecute-the
determination of gravity and the interests of justice."); id at 145 (arguing that the interests of
justice was a concept purposefully left ambiguous by the drafters and that the Prosecutor
currently has "considerable leeway in determining which investigations are in the interests of
justice").
181. Kenya Decision, supra note 34,
191-95. The dissent explicitly criticized this
deference as excessive.
182. Id. IT 199-200 (The majority "consider[ed] that some of the specific crimes
committed in the context of the potential incidents suggested by the Prosecutor satisfy the
element of scale. This is so having regard to the number of bumed houses, deaths, and displaced
people... Some of the crimes.. .were also marked by elements of brutality, for example, burning
victims alive, attacking places sheltering IDPs, beheadings, and using pangas and machetes to
hack people to death.").
183. Cote d'Ivoire Decision, supra note 173, T 205 (The Pre-Trial Chamber reiterated the
Prosecutor's findings regarding the number of victims, and it accepted the Prosecutor's assertion
that the alleged crimes of murder, rape, and enforced disappearance were "committed on a large
scale").
184. Id.
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Chamber's silence) obviate the need to analyze other factors. In
addition, the fact that the Pre-Trial Chambers emphasized the same two
gravity factors of scale and manner of commission in both decisions
may suggest that the judges saw these two factors as perhaps more
determinative than the others. However, in the decision regarding the
situation in Cote d'Ivoire, the Pre-Trial Chamber simply echoed the
Prosecutor's own focus on these two factors, and in neither decision did
it expressly restrict the analysis. Therefore, it seems equally possible
that the Pre-Trial Chamber simply accepted as sufficiently reasonable
the Prosecutor's decision to emphasize these particular factors in the
latter case.1 85
What these decisions do demonstrate is that the Pre-Trial Chamber
has not been aggressive in questioning the Prosecutor's gravity
interpretations or establishing generally applicable interpretive rules or
hierarchies. At a minimum, the Court has granted the Prosecutor
significant power to decide which factors and criteria should be relevant
to the gravity determination in any given situation.1 86 This deference has
given the Prosecutor primary authority to select from among multiple
plausible interpretations of gravity in different propriomotu decisions.
V. SHIFTING THE POWER DYNAMICS WITHIN THE COURT

A. ProsecutorialSteps Toward Lawmaking
That the Prosecutor has found a legal way to assert discretion over
the proprio motu selection of situations is hugely consequential in itself.
To date, the Prosecutor has successfully leveraged this discretion to
emphasize particular contexts of crimes, and to thus exert powerful
influence over the Court's policy priorities. This is a formidable power
to be able to claim, especially in light of the Court's encompassing
jurisdictional mandate. 1 7 However, the Prosecutor's deployment of
independent and primary authority to weigh and prioritize the many
flexible criteria governing the gravity determination and to establish
definitive and controlling interpretations has an even broader
significance.
Normally, courts and judicial actors are charged with interpreting
185. deGuzman, Gravity, supra note 29, at 1423-24 (observing that the Court has not
established rules on gravity beyond overruling the argument that gravity necessarily involves
considering the "social alarm" of crimes).
186. Id.
187. This is not to suggest either that this form of discretion is illegitimate or that the
particular contexts identified by the Prosecutor (severe instances of post-election violence in
Africa) do not warrant the Court's attention. Rather, it is simply to note the result of the
Prosecutor's proprio motu choices.
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treaties and statutes, and they regularly establish rules to fill gaps and
clarify ambiguities by finding a particular interpretation to be valid or
controlling over others-such actions are relatively commonplace
across many different types of international organizations.' 88 Many
scholars have persuasively argued that when courts or judicial actors
make such interpretations and engage in such gap-filling, they are in
effect making international law. For example, Armin von Bogdandy and
Ingo Venzke argue, "every decision concerning the use or interpretation
of a concept contributes to the making of its content. The discretionar
and creative elements in the application of the law make the law.", 9
Laurence Helfer and Karen Alter further suggest that "some degree of
lawmaking-including activities such as 'developing, adapting,
modifying, filling gaps, interpreting, or even branching out in a new
direction'-is an inevitable part of judging and thus a legitimate judicial
function."l90 Tom Ginsburg contends, "judicial lawmaking inheres in
the incompleteness of any system of rules . . . When confronted with a

situation where there is no clear pre-existing rule, the judge must make
a new rule."191 Once a court establishes such an interpretation, it
becomes controlling in itself, filling in the spaces left blank by the treaty
188. See, e.g., Ingo Venzke, The Role of International Courts as Interpreters and
Developers of Law: Working Out the JurisgenerativePracticeof Interpretation, 34 Lov. L.A.
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 99, 127 (2011) ("In the practice of adjudication, international courts
exercise semantic authority and thereby contribute to the making of international law"); Helfer
& Alter, supra note 96, at 481 ("As international judges adjudicate a widening array of
controversies, they must inevitably clarify the meaning of ambiguous international rules and
apply them to unforeseen contexts"); Jose E. Alvarez, International Organizations: Then and
Now, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 324, 328-29 (2006).
Given the lack of stare decisis in the international system, perhaps the largest
body of emerging "soft law" today is the ever-increasing numbers ofjudgments
issued by various permanent international courts and tribunals, as well as the
myriad comments and views issued by institutionalized human rights treaty
bodies and officials such as the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture.
Id.; Kenneth W. Abbott et al., The Concept of Legalization, 54 INT'L ORG. 401, 415 (2001)
(describing how imprecision within a treaty can, when coupled with a delegation of decisionmaking or interpretive authority to an international body, "grants to an international body wider
authority to determine its meaning").
189. Von Bogdandy & Venzke, supra note 21, at 985 ("The practice of international
adjudication creates and shifts actors' normative expectations and as such develops legal
normativity").
190. Helfer & Alter, supra note 96, at 484, (citing MOHAMED SHAHABUDDEEN, PRECEDENT
INTHE WORLD 91 (2007) (quoting International Court of Justice Judge Sir Robert Jennings)).
191. Tom Ginsburg, Bounded Discretion in InternationalJudicial Lawmaking, 45 VA. J.
INT'L L. 631, 635 (2004). See also ALVAREZ, supra note 22; Von Bogdandy & Venzke, supra
note 21, at 983 ("Judicial lawmaking is an integral element of almost any adjudicatory

practice").

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2013

45

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 25, Iss. 3 [2013], Art. 2
404

FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 25

or statute.
The Court itself has claimed such interpretive authority in its
complementarity jurisprudence. The text of articles 17(1)(a) and (b)
contain a critical gap: these provisions do not specify whether a
presently inactive but theoretically willing and able state must first be
given a chance to investigate or prosecute before a particular situation
or case became admissible before the Court. 192 The Appeals Chamber
interpreted the statutory language to allow the Prosecutor to proceed in
cases of domestic inaction, even if the relevant state was theoretically
willing and able to proceed. 193 The Appeals Chamber held that, to
challenge the admissibility of an entire situation, the relevant state must
have already taken investigative or prosecutorial action with respect to
the same case or set of cases before the Court.' 94 These decisions
informed and developed the concept of complementarity.195 They did
not simply clarify the relevant interpretive guidelines or procedures
governing the complementarity determination.' 9 6 Rather, these
decisions substantively developed the concept of complementarity
itself, beyond its statutory definition, establishing as controlling one out
of many plausible interpretations. In holding that a complementary
institution such as the Court could in fact take action without first
determining that a state is clearly unwilling or unable to act, the Court
established that an institution of last resort may, in certain
circumstances, actually act first.197
Gravit, is another concept that has been incompletely defined by the
Statute.19 The statutory language and attendant regulations establish the
outer boundaries of the concept, but much ambiguity remains. There
192. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 17(1)(a) & (b).
193. See Katanga Appeals Decision, supra note 117, 78.
194. See generally Kenya Admissibility Appeal, supra note 73.
195. Von Bogdandy & Venzke, supra note 21, at 979 ("The practice of international
adjudication creates and shifts actors' normative expectations and as such develops legal
normativity").
196. See generally Kenya Admissibility Appeal, supra note 73.
197. Although the Court grounded its complementarity jurisprudence firmly within the
statutory language, there are clearly other options for the meaning of complementarity. For
debates on other options, see Katanga Appeals Decision, supra note 117 (arguing that a state
referring the case to the Court does not cohere with the principle of complementarity). For the
appeal by the government of Kenya challenging the admissibility of the particular cases before
the Court, see Kenya Admissibility Appeal, supra note 73 (arguing that Kenya has demonstrated
sufficient domestic action with respect to some of the cases involving post-election violence).
See also Von Bogdandy & Venzke, supra note 21, at 987 (Von Bogdandy and Venzke
summarize the impact of interpretive rules on subsequent substantive analyses: "A judgment, its
decisions, as well as its justification can amount to significant legal arguments in later disputes
about what the law means.").
198. See, e.g., Ray Murphy, Gravity Issues and the International Criminal Court, 17
CRIM. L.F. 281, 282 (2006).
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may have been compelling needs for this statutory indeterminacy: the
drafters may well have left the term deliberately undefined due to the
lack of consensus on any exclusive or exhaustive definition of
gravity.199 The Court's potential to encounter extremely diverse
situations may further argue against adopting a definition that was either
over-inclusive or under-inclusive. 20 0 Still, gravity interpretations have
not solidified, either through the Court's practice or through the broader
development of international criminal law. Rather, ongoing debates
about how to properly assess the gravity of situations only further
cement the flexibility of the concept.
As it did with respect to complementarity, the Court clearly has both
the authority and the competency to weigh competing gravity criteria
and establish a controlling set of hierarchies.2 0 2 However, at least to
date, it has refrained from doing so. Moreover, in the context of proprio
motu decision-making, the Court is not the only, or even the primary,
actor able to establish such interpretations. Rather, when acting proprio
motu, the Prosecutor decides how gravity should be defined in particular
203
contexts.20 It is this fact that most sharply distinguishes the lawmaking
inhering in the OTP's interpretations of sufficient gravity from other
forms of lawmaking by international organizations. Virtually all treaties
have gaps that at a minimum emerge through practice, if not through the
text of the instrument itself. And, as new issues emerge, these gaps must
be filled. The fact that such gaps exist in the Rome Statute is hardly
surprising, nor is the fact that they are progressively being filled over
the course of the Court's first decade of operation.
The critical (and
perhaps more surprising) issue is which actor within the Court has filled
199. For relevant portions of the drafting history, see, e.g., REPORT ON THE COMM'N TO THE
GEN. ASSEMBLY, 44th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/87/10; 47 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 10. REPORT ON THE
COMM'N TO THE GEN. ASSEMBLY, 46th Sess., May 2-July 22, 1994, U.N. Doc. A/49/10, 49 U.N.
GAOR Supp. No. 10 (1994); REPORT OF THE AD Hoc COMM. ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN

INT'L CRIMINAL COURT, 50th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/50/22, U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 22; Comments
Received Pursuant to Paragraph 4 of Gen. Assembly Resolution 49/53 on the Establishment of
an Int'l Criminal Court, REPORT TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL, U.N. Doc. A/AC.244/1/Add.4

(1995); SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 1lTH MEETING, IT 22-29, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/
SR.11 (1998).
200. See, e.g., deGuzman, Gravity, supra note 29, at 1402 (characterizing gravity as undertheorized and addressing the many situations potentially admissible before the Court and the
resulting impact on gravity).

201. See Leila Nadya Sadat & S. Richard Carden, The New InternationalCriminal Court:
An Uneasy Revolution, 88 GEO. L.J. 381, 419 (2000); Murphy, Gravity Issues and the
InternationalCriminalCourt, 17 CRIM. L. F. 281, 282.
202. Katanga Appeals Decision, supra note 117, 78.
203. Von Bogdandy & Venzke, supra note 21, at 985 (citing Robert B. Brandom, Some
Pragmatist Themes in Hegel's Idealism: Negotiation and Administration in Hegel's Account of
the Structureand Content of ConceptualNorms, 7 EUR. J.PHIL. 164, 180 (1999)).
204. Helfer & Alter, supra note 96, at 484.
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them.
In deciding what gravity can and should mean when making proprio
motu decisions, it is the OTP (and not the Court) who independently
resolves the statutory ambiguities. 2 05 As the actor charged with making
the initial assessment about whether a particular situation is sufficiently
grave to justify proprio motu action, the Prosecutor becomes the
primary "actor[] of interpretation," and thus claims a considerable
degree of power.2 06 As the first voice with the authority to answer the
question of what gravity means when acting proprio motu, the
Prosecutor can independently decide how the Statute should be
interpreted. 207 To be sure, the Prosecutor must exercise this interpretive
power within the guideposts set forth by the Statute, the Regulations of
the OTP, and the relevant Court decisions; however, these boundaries
have proven to be fairly accommodating, granting the Prosecutor a
notable degree of interpretive freedom and autonomy.208 The abovediscussed limits on judicial review of these interpretations ensure that,
in at least some instances, the Prosecutor's is the only voice deciding
what gravity means, and that the Prosecutor can independently enforce
the consequences of her interpretations (for example, by deciding that a
situation is insufficiently grave to prosecute). The primacy of the
Prosecutor's interpretation imbues them with considerable weight.
Through her proprio motu decision-making, the Prosecutor
independently feeds and directs the substantive development of the
concept, deciding both what sufficient gavity means and (in the case of
Iraq, for example) what it does not. 9 To date, the Prosecutor has
established the validity of both absolute and relative interpretations of
gravity, of interpretations based primarily on quantitative thresholds,
and of interpretations assessing multiple quantitative and qualitative
factors in aggregate and non-hierarchically. These interpretations come
with tangible and significant consequences, as the Prosecutor relies
heavily on her gravity findings to justify proprio motu action or inaction
and to thus direct the Court toward some situations and away from
others. Moreover, the Prosecutor's gravity interpretations are not
inherently limited to any particular context or situation; rather, each one
205. Rome Statute, supra note 2, arts. 53, 15 (charging the Prosecutor with making the
initial assessment).
206. Venzke, supra note 188, at 102.
207. Martin Shapiro, Judicial Independence: New Challenges in EstablishedNations, 20
IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 253, 254 (2013) ("Whoever interprets the law or says what a

legal text means, to some degree, at some times, and under some circumstances, makes the
law.").
208. Venzke, supra note 188, at 102 (affirming the existence of constraints on all forms of
international lawmaking).
209. Von Bogdandy & Venzke, supra note 21, at 990 ("Decisions figure as arguments and
influence the law through their impact in the legal discourse").
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simply presents a plausible conception of what gravity means generally
with respect to international crimes.
It should be noted that neither the Court nor the OTP has admitted
that the Prosecutor is exercising anything close to this level of
interpretive power or lawmaking capacity in proprio motu decisionmaking.21 o Rather, both actors perpetuate the fiction that the Statute
compels only particular conclusions. 2 11 Given the exceptionally fraught
political context in which the Court operates, it is understandable that,
like many international organizations engaging in some form of
lawmaking, both the Court and the OTP would " ortray their practice as
[strictly] applying the law that is given to them." 2 The OTP has, in the
face of pervasive criticisms of proprio motu prosecutions (especially in
the case of Kenya), doubled down on the concept that her proprio motu
actions are compelled by law that was created by someone else (the
However, while technically true that the
Statute and the Court).
Prosecutor does not consider any criteria beyond those required by the
Statute when making proprio motu decisions, this conception of
prosecutorial decision-making overlooks a critical nuance. The problem
with suggesting that the Prosecutor merely acts proprio motu at the
direction of other sources is that, when acting proprio motu, the
Prosecutor is the primary interpreter of the exceptionally broad criteria
that those sources provide. The more precise statement is not that the
Prosecutor does what existing law requires her to do, but instead that the
OTP acts proprio motu based on what the Prosecutor decides the law
requires her to do.
By independently establishing and enforcing gravity determinations
through proprio motu action or inaction, the Prosecutor decides "what
should legall, be and how a provision [of the Statute] should be
interpreted." 2 4 The Prosecutor's proprio motu practice, with its
fundamental reliance on gravity interpretations generated within the
OTP as justification for actions taken or not taken, reinforces the
validity of those interpretations. In addition, this practice fills in the
meaning of sufficient gravity under the Statute by providing both
examples and counterexamples. In these ways, the Prosecutor's proprio
motu practice both "generates and upholds the law" that she makes with
210. I am grateful to Jose Alvarez for making this point. See, e.g., MARTIN SHAPIRO,
COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS (1986); Venzke, supra note 188, at 103.
211. See Martin Shapiro, Judges as Liars, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 155, 156 (1994).
212. Venzke, supra note 188, at 103. See also id. at 104, noting that this practice is
commonplace in international institutions other than international courts as well.
213. JUDITH SHKLAR, LEGALISM: LAW, MORALS, AND POLITICAL TRIALS 12-13 (1964).
See also Venzke, supra note 188, at 108 ("The idea that international courts can confine
themselves to applying the law hinges on the notion that the law is made by someone else").
214. See Venzke, supra note 188, at 121; see generally Laurence R. Helfer,
NonconsensualInternationalLawmaking, 2008 ILL. L. REV. 71 (2008).
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regard to gravity and reaffirms her authority to make it. 2 15
However, the Prosecutor's proprio motu practice differs from
traditional conceptions of lawmaking in a crucial way. The OTP's
varied gravity interpretations, especially when examined in aggregate,
reaffirm the concept's indeterminacy-only with a concept so flexible
and accommodating could such divergent interpretations be relied upon
as equally plausible justifications of decisions about whether or not to
proceed proprio motu. The Prosecutor's propriomotu practice therefore
does not establish what legally should be as much as it reinforces the
variety of what legally could be within broad outer boundaries. Unlike
the Court's complementarity jurisprudence, which established one
particular interpretation as controlling, the Prosecutor's proprio motu
gravity analyses reinforce the plausibility of multiple interpretations and
affirm the absence of a single controlling conception.
The implications of the Prosecutor's primary and independent
assertions of interpretive power with respect to the gravity
determination are exceptionally consequential for the Court and its
stakeholders. The Rome Statute did not empower the Prosecutor to
independently make law with respect to gravity or any other issue.
Rather, the Statute created a Court with particular divisions of power
and competencies, and, as the extensive and vigorous debates about the
relevant provisions affirm, the drafters attempted to exhaustively
circumscribe many aspects of the Prosecutor's proprio motu decisionmaking.2 16 The Prosecutor's potential assertion of lawmaking authority
with respect to proprio motu gravity determinations illuminates the
divergence between the heavily negotiated procedural principles and
specified competences of the Statute and resulting practice.2 1 7 Certainly,
many more international organizations engage in lawmaking than are
expressly empowered to do so. 2 18 Still, even if the Court, like other
international organizations, could reasonably be expected to make law
to resolve statutory ambiguities, the fact that the Prosecutor is doing so
independently is uniquely significant insofar as it enables the Prosecutor
to deploy a power generally reserved for the Court's Chambers.
Admitting that it is the Prosecutor who may be independently making
215. Venzke, supra note 188, at 121.
216. For a review of the relevant provisions of the drafting history, see, e.g., Schabas,
supra note 2, at 539-40; Danner, supra note 16, at 513-14; Daniel D. Ntanda Nsereko,
Triggering the Jurisdictionof the InternationalCriminal Court, 4 AF. HuM. RTs. L. J. 256, 26365 (2004).
217. Von Bogdandy & Venzke, supra note 21, at 994. Von Bogdandy and Venzke
observe, "once an international agreement is in place, it is largely withdrawn from the grasp of
its individual makers [and that] this profoundly changes the relationship between law and
politics."
218. ALVAREZ, supra note 22, at 10-11 ("Few lOs are accorded explicit law-making
powers").
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law would be much more destabilizing than simply conceding that, like
many other international organizations, the Court itself is doing so.
The Prosecutor's proprio motu gravity interpretations have had
notable consequences outside of as well as within the Court, with the
inconsistency among interpretations being the subject of frequent
criticism by the Court's stakeholders.2 1 9 Persuasive arguments exist for
interpreting gravity in different ways based on different factual
contexts-indeed, the varied situations potentially or actually before the
Court clearly demonstrate that situations can be grave in many different
ways, and that a single gravity interpretation may not fit even most
situations before the Court, much less all. When making proprio motu
decisions, the OTP may moreover be the actor best situated to make the
initial interpretation, given its extensive engagement with the facts on
the ground. Yet, these arguments have hardly insulated the Prosecutor's
gravity interpretations from vehement critiques and challenges or
endowed the Prosecutor's proprio motu decisions with increased
legitimacy. Rather, critics of the Prosecutor's proprio motu decisionmaking regularly cite the unpredictable and at times self-contradictory
nature of the Prosecutor's gravity assessments to undermine the
legitimacy of the resulting decisions.
The necessary assumption underlying these critiques seems to be
that gravity should be more consistently interpreted, even across
divergent factual contexts.221 In the face of this assumption, the
incoherence of the Prosecutor's proprio motu interpretations makes
219. For an overview of the relevant critiques with respect to the Prosecutor's varying
gravity interpretations for situations inside and outside of Africa, see Max du Plessis, The
International Criminal Court and Its Work in Africa: Confronting the Myths, Institute for
Security Studies Paper No. 173 (Nov. 5, 2008), available at http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/
PAPER173.PDF. See also International Federation for Human Rights, The Office of the
Prosecutorof the ICC, 9 Years On: An Analysis of the ProsecutorialStrategy and Policies of
the Office of the Prosecutor (2003-2011) (Dec. 2011), available at http://fidh.org/IMG//pdf/
cpiproc579ang.pdf; Tim Murithi, The African Union and the InternationalCriminal Court: An
Embattled Relationship (Mar. 2013), available at http://ijr.org.za/publications/pdfs/IJR%20
Policy/o20Brief/2ONo%208%2OTim%20Miruthi.pdf
220. See, e.g., Hansen, supra note 76, at 203.
Rather than creating greater clarity concerning how situations will be selected,
relying on the criteria utilized in the Kenyan situation could exacerbate
perceptions of unjustified selectivity simply because these [more flexible and
expansive gravity] criteria allow the Court to intervene in more situations while
the number of active investigations is unlikely to increase correspondingly.
Id.
221. Venzke, supra note 188, at 121 ("The law gains shape and develops in this
interpretation in which actors demand and give reasons for or against a particular interpretation
of a provision").
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both those interpretations and the ultimate decisions appear more
illegitimate, illuminating the cost of appearing to "randomly alternat[e]
between two rules in like cases." 2 Yet, as the Statute does not
specifically define gravity, the Regulations of the OTP preserve
significant flexibility, and the Court has repeatedly refrained from
establishing a definitive gravity interpretation, the Prosecutor has not
acted outside of the boundaries imposed either by the Statute or
Regulations or in defiance of Court precedent. Rather, the Prosecutor is
only (albeit sometimes blatantly) contradicting the OTP's own prior
gravity interpretations.
In faulting the resulting incoherence, these critiques assume that the
Prosecutor should at least be guided, if not actually bound, by the
OTP's own interpretations of gravity in other contexts. That the
Prosecutor has interpreted, gravity within the broader boundaries
established both by the Court and by the relevant constituting
instruments is not enough to legitimize the resulting decisions. These
critiques thus suggest the extent to which the Court's stakeholders and
interested parties rely on the Prosecutor's independent interpretive
justifications, in addition to the Statute and the Court's decisions, to
build normative expectations about the meaning of gravity. 223 They
moreover concretize the legitimacy costs of destabilizing or
contradicting these expectations, even when the particular
interpretations are legal under the Statute and coherent with the Court's
general jurisprudence.2 24
Suggesting that the Prosecutor's inadequate adherence to the OTP's
prior interpretations delegitimizes her subsequent decisions further
implies that the Prosecutor's prior interpretations should be given a kind
of precedential value, and that this precedent is violated by the OTP's
subsequent inconsistencies and failure to explain or justify them.22 5 As
Ginsburg observes, "incremental decision-making tends to create
systems of precedent, whether acknowledged or not." 226 Yet,
222. Ginsburg, supra note 191, at 636. See also Von Bogdandy & Venzke, supra note 21,
at 13 ("For good reasons, actors tend to develop their normative expectations in accordance with
past judgments. They will at least expect a court to rule consistently if a similar case arises").
223. See generally Von Bogdandy & Venzke, supra note 21; Ginsburg, supra note 191.
224. Venzke, supra note 188, at 123. ("Courts are expected to decide consistently or, if
they deviate from previous jurisprudence, to give reasons why they do so"). See also Von
Bogdandy & Venzke, supra note 21, at 986 (discussing "the creation and development of actors'
general normative expectations-that is expectations sustained and stabilized by law about how
actors should act and, more specifically, how they should interpret the law"); see generally
Arato, supra note 75 (on the difference between political and juridical perspectives).
225.

ALAN E. BOYLE & CHRISTINE M. CHINKIN, THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

267 (2007).
226.

Ginsburg, supra note

191,

at 635-36

(citing MARTIN SHAPIRO,

CouRTs: A

COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 155 (1986)).
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determining the precedential nature of the Prosecutor's gravity
interpretations becomes more complex upon a closer examination of
what exactly those interpretations establish.
The Prosecutor's proprio motu decision-making has gradually
crystallized two key aspects of the gravity determination: that gravity as
a concept is broad enough to plausibly encompass multiple and even
inconsistent interpretations; and that the Prosecutor has both primary
and independent authority, at least when acting proprio motu, to decide
which interpretation should control in a given context. This decisionmaking, when examined in aggregate, differs from traditional
conceptions of precedent in a fundamental way. The function of
precedent is to enforce the stability of interpretations and consistency of
decision-making across situations of "relevant similarity," thereby
"creat[ing] argumentative burdens based on prior decisions] [that]
constrain [future] decision-making." ' In this way, precedent directly
constrains the decision-maker, requiring her to make future decisions
based on prior rules and enforcing prior interpretations against future
contexts, despite the inevitable differences between past and future
situations. 228 Similarly, lawmaking by international judicial actors
generally should function to enforce stability of legal interpretations that
fill statutory gaps across contexts, enhancing the predictability of the

system as a whole. 229
The Prosecutor's adoption of varied gravity interpretations, in
contrast, imbues proprio motu decision-making with uncertainty and
unpredictability, precluding rather than generating a single or definitive
gravity precedent. Rather than "concretiz[ing] programs" or "solv[ing]
contradictions," the Prosecutor's gravity interpretations do the opposite:
validating the multiplicity of meanings gravity can have, and thus
preserving rather than resolving the contradictions among them. 2 30 The
ability of the Prosecutor's gravity interpretations to carry the force of
law appears to be profoundly limited by these internal inconsistencies.
Whenever the Prosecutor relies on an inconsistent gravity framework to
justify proprio motu action or inaction-for example, relying on a
227.
GERMAN
228.
(2013).
229.

Marc Jacob, Precedents: Lawmaking Through International Adjudication, 12
L.J. 1005, 1024-25 (2011).
Harlan Cohen, InternationalLaw's Erie Moment, 34 MICH. J. INT'L L. 249, 277

Alec Stone Sweet, Path Dependence, Precedent, and Judicial Power, in ON LAW,
112, 117 (Alec Stone Sweet & Martin Shapiro eds., 2002)
("Judicial rule-making, being more or less authoritative, should function to reduce uncertainty
about the nature and scope of the standard").
230. Armin von Bogdandy & Ingo Venzke, On the Democratic Legitimation of
International Judicial Lawmaking, 12 GERMAN L.J. 1341, 1345 (2011) (quoting
Bundesverfassungssgericht (Federal Constitutional Court, FCC), 1 64, 6 July 2010, 2 BvR
2661/06).
POLITICS, AND JUDICIALIZATION
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combination of quantitative and qualitative factors to initiate a proprio
motu investigation into the situation in Kenya and eschewing the prior
threshold emphasis on scale adopted in the declination to proceed in
Iraq-the legal force of the current interpretation seems to both
undermine and be undermined by the prior inconsistent one. While this
decision-making practice enlarges the scope of the Prosecutor's proprio
motu power by broadening the boundaries of her discretion with respect
to the meaning of gravity, it also seems to constrain her lawmaking
ability by making the status of each gravity interpretation inherently
precarious, able to be subsequently undercut.
B. Implicationsfor JudicialInterpretive Supremacy
Gravity is certainly interpreted in many contexts other than decisions
about proprio motu investigations. Yet, the Prosecutor exerts much
greater interpretive authority over proprio motu decisions than over
external referrals. 23 1 This raises the question of how the Prosecutor's
proprio motu interpretations interact with other gravity interpretations
made or sanctioned by the Court. The many scholars criticizing the
incoherence of the aggregate do not always distinguish between the
gravity of situations and of individual cases, much less between the
gravity of situations investigated proprio motu and those investigated
based on a referral by a state party or the Security Council. 2 3 Yet
231. Article 53 does apply to external referrals as well as article 15 proceedings, thus
suggesting that whatever discretion it permits the Prosecutor also applies across the board.
However, the Prosecutor has established a policy of interpreting these two types of triggering
mechanisms from opposite starting points, and this difference influences the resulting level of
prosecutorial discretion with respect to a particular situation. In a policy paper, the OTP details
these opposing starting points: "where the Prosecutor receives a referral, article 53 provides that
the Prosecutor shall initiate an investigation unless [s]he determines that there is no reasonable
basis to proceed . . . When the Prosecutor receives a communication [attempting to trigger
article 15 action], the test is the same but the starting point is reversed: the Prosecutor shall not
seek to initiate an investigation unless he first concludes that there is a reasonable basis to
proceed"). Referrals and Communications, supra note 15, at 2. The Court has repeatedly held
that the reasonable basis standard is extremely low. When analyzing external referrals, the
Prosecutor thus must analyze the information supplied to determine whether a reasonable basis
could be found to argue in favor of action. This frame of analysis does not require the
Prosecutor to decide whether that basis is the correct or optimal basis. The Prosecutor thus
seems likely to be anchored to the initial interpretations by the referring entity in similar ways as
the Pre-Trial Chamber seems to be anchored to the Prosecutor's findings in proprio motu
actions. In contrast, when deciding whether to actproprio motu, the Prosecutor makes the initial
finding.
232. As an example of such criticisms, see, e.g., Schabas, supra note 99, at 743-48
(comparing the Prosecutor's decision not to initiate an investigation into the situation in Iraq
based on gravity with both the analysis of gravity in the situations in the Democratic Republic of
Congo and Uganda and with the gravity of the crimes committed in a particular case by Thomas
Lubanga). For similar comparisons and criticisms, see deGuzman, Gravity, supra note 29, at
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another distinction exists between interpretations of gravity that have
actually been reviewed by the Court and those solely made and
reviewed within the OTP. Still, many scholars also appear to equate
interpretations of gravity that have never been reviewed by the Court
(for example, regarding the situation in Iraq) with those expressly
evaluated (and implicitly sanctioned) by the Court (for example,
regarding the situations in Kenya and Cote d'Ivoire).2 33
These many conflations suggest that the OTP's independent gravity
interpretations may be viewed, at least by outsiders to the Court, as
functionally co-equal to gravity interpretations made or sanctioned by
the Court. Legally, this cannot be the case-the Court must have the
power to establish a controlling interpretation of gravity, just as it has
done with respect to complementarity.234 However, asserting such
judicial supremacy in practice may now prove difficult. The Prosecutor
has repeatedly asserted independent authority to decide how gravity
criteria may plausibly be weighed and prioritized. These prior gravity
interpretations were not merely theoretical or abstract; rather, they led to
significant and tangible consequences in terms of where the Court
allocated its resources and what types of crimes were investigated and
prosecuted. Were the Court to now establish a controlling rule that
contradicts (and as a result, overrides) even some of these prior
interpretations (a likely result, given their wide variation and
inconsistencies with each other), that decision would necessarily imply
that the Prosecutor's prior inconsistent interpretations were incorrect.
Considering the Prosecutor's heavy reliance on gravity to justify
proprio motu decision-making, such an inference would almost
certainly damage the legitimacy of those prior proprio motu decisions
that relied on prior inconsistent interpretations, and it may even argue in
favor of reconsideration or rescission of a prior decision. 2 35 This is not
to suggest that such criticisms of the OTP may not be warranted.2 3 6
However, competing concerns regarding the legitimacy of the Court and
the standing and validity of its prior (and extremely politically fraught)
decisions may still motivate the Court to avoid them.
1460 (comparing the gravity analysis in the Iraq decision with the Prosecutor's decision to
prosecute the killing of twelve peacekeepers in Haskanita).
233. deGuzman, Gravity, supra note 29, at 1460-61; Schabas, supra note 99, at 747-48;
Kevin Jon Heller, Situational Gravity Under the Rome Statute, in FUTURE DIRECTIONS IN
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE (Carsten Stahn & Larissa Van Der Herki eds., 2009).

234. See generally Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Judgment on the Appeal of the Prosecutor
Against the Decision of the Trial Chamber I of 8 July 2010, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06/2585
(Aug. 10, 2010).
235. Goldston, supranote 80, at 12.
236. This Article does not take a position on the wisdom or accuracy of these criticisms.
Rather, the relevant point is how they characterize the various gravity determinations and the
resulting legitimacy implications for the Court.
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The Prosecutor's proprio motu decision-making thus situates the
Court between competing incentives, placing the Court's interest in
maintaining the supremacy of its judicial interpretations of statutory
criteria potentially in opposition to its interest in avoiding broad-based
legitimacy challenges. Affirming a conception of gravity that is broad
and flexible enough to accommodate multiple plausible interpretations
may, in this context, remain a palatable compromise, even considering
that in practice this compromise has enabled the Prosecutor to
significantly expand the power she can legally deploy vis-a-vis the
Court.
VI. CONCLUSION

The Prosecutor has consistently disclaimed any authority to exercise
discretion over proprio motu decisions. However, because situations
can be grave in many different ways, the choice of a particular gravity
interpretation often determines the ultimate conclusion about
admissibility. To date, the Prosecutor has leveraged both her
independent authority over proprio motu decision-making and the
inherent flexibility of the gravity determination to assert considerable
interpretive autonomy. Through her proprio motu practice, the
Prosecutor has cemented the following propositions: first, that the
gravity determination has multiple plausible interpretations; second, that
these interpretations may be contradictory does not make any one
implausible in a given context; and third, that the OTP is empowered to
decide what gravity should mean when making proprio motu
evaluations of situations. These propositions, taken together, empower
the Prosecutor to decide whether a particular situation should be
admissible at the point that she selects a particular interpretive
framework. As a result, the Prosecutor has seized notable authority to
decide where the Court should direct its attention and resources.
The Prosecutor's proprio motu practice grounds both the authority to
select the initial gravity analysis and the resulting conclusions firmly
within the Statute itself. In doing so, the Prosecutor has leveraged both
her statutorily guarded independence over proprio motu decisions and
the accommodating nature of the gravity interpretation to carve out
discretion over selection decisions. Through her proprio motu practice,
the Prosecutor balances the practical need to focus the Court's attention
and resources toward only some (rather than all) situations within its
jurisdiction with the significant risks inherent in claiming extrastatutory or policy-making authority to select from among admissible
situations. This manifestation of discretion seems to be an attempt by
the Prosecutor to avoid asserting truly extra-statutory and unauthorized
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power when actingproprio motu.
Still, the actual power claimed is significant, especially when
examined in the broader context of the Court's operation and
jurisprudence. In making the initial decision about which interpretation
to select, the Prosecutor independently develops the content of the
concept of gravity. The sole focus on scale in the situation in Iraq
affirmed as valid two alternate conceptions of gravity: that gravity can
be solely quantitative, or that scale functions as a primary threshold that
must be satisfied before additional factors may be considered. The
multi-factor gravity analysis in the situations in Kenya and Cote
d'Ivoire affirms a seemingly contradictory conception: that gravity
necessarily incorporates qualitative as well as quantitative factors
analyzed in aggregate and non-hierarchically. In each decision, the
Prosecutor simply implied that the given interpretation was in fact what
gravity meant, casting the resulting conclusions on admissibility as
compelled by that finding. As a consequence, these competing
conceptions of gravity are not inherently limited by their particular
contexts; rather, they are at least potentially applicable to future gravity
assessments.
The Prosecutor's proprio motu development of the concept of
gravity raises many questions. The relevant decisions have been relied
upon by the Prosecutor and, in the instances of Kenya and Cote
d'Ivoire, accepted by the Court as plausible interpretations of gravity,
but their precedential value remains unclear. If the Prosecutor were
presented with a new situation within the Court's jurisdiction involving
a relatively small number of victims-for example, the situation in the
Republic of Korea-must the OTP automatically reject it as
insufficiently grave based on the interpretation of gravity adopted in the
Iraq decision? Or, is the OTP free to reconceive gravity as not being
dependent on scale and to simply disregard prior inconsistent decisions?
Another set of questions relates to the role and capacity of the PreTrial Chamber. The twin concerns of constraining a rogue or politicized
Prosecutor and preserving prosecutorial independence to trigger the
Court's jurisdiction without political direction understandably shaped
the contours of judicial review over proprio motu actions. Yet, within
these contours remain many critically important holes. Must the PreTrial Chamber consider the Prosecutor's prior proprio motu gravity
interpretations when evaluating the reasonableness of an interpretation
in a new application to open an investigation? If the Prosecutor sought
to proceed with respect to the situation in the Republic of Korea, for
example, and argued that the situation was sufficiently grave base on
non-quantitative factors, could the Pre-Trial Chamber consider the
Prosecutor's prior contradictory interpretation of gravity in the situation
in Iraq, or could it instead only assess the reasonableness of the
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interpretation before it? The latter option would seem to have
significant implications for the accountability of the Prosecutor to her
past decisions. The former, however, would have similarly
consequential implications for the Prosecutor's independence vis-a-vis
the Court. If the Prosecutor's gravity interpretations take on
precedential characteristics, can the Chamber consider interpretations it
cannot directly review to enforce interpretive coherence? If these
interpretations are instead excluded from the Court's precedent, can the
Prosecutor's reliance on inconsistent interpretations in unreviewable
contexts-for example, in declinations to proceed based on insufficient
gravity-be considered legitimate in light of their incompatibility with
precedent? These questions will likely become more tangibly
consequential as the Prosecutor continues to develop her proprio motu
practice.
More broadly, beyond simply continuing to inform the nature of
proprio motu discretion, these issues also have a substantial impact on
the internal power dynamics and balances within the Court. In
deploying a discretion that is operationalized through the law of the
Statute itself, the Prosecutor has profoundly shifted the Court's internal
structure of power from one in which the Statute limited the
Prosecutor's power vis-a-vis the Court to one in which, at least with
respect to proprio motu actions, the Prosecutor has independently
defined, enforced, and enlarged the scope of her own power within the
Court as a whole.
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